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INTRODUCTION

Condominiums have become widely popular in the years since 1958,
when Puerto Rico adopted the first condominium enabling statute.'

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A., 1973, Lehigh University; J.D.,
1976, University of Michigan. My colleague Marion Benfield was kind enough to provide comments on a draft of this article.
1. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 1291-1294d (Supp. 1985). Historical background is set
forth in Cribbet, Condominium- Home Ownershipfor Megalopolis?, 51 MICH. L. REV. 1207,
1210-19 (1963).
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Today all states authorize condominium ownership and regulate in
some detail the creation, sale, and management of condominium projects.2 During the past decade, many states have replaced their first-

generation condominium statutes 2 Several have adopted the Uniform
Condominium Act, first proposed for enactment in 1977 and revised
in 1980. 4 Others have turned to the substantially similar Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, first proposed in 1982. s
One issue that state condominium laws address poorly is condominium tort liability. Many statutes make no reference to the issue
or refer to the subject only obliquely, 6 while others deal with the issue
directly but in ways that reflect confusion and that leave crucial issues
unresolved. 7 State courts have done little better." Opinions in the area
are short, simplistic, and unsatisfying. As a whole, they reflect a
desire to deal with the subject piecemeal and a disinclination to grapple
with the conflicting policy concerns at stake.
As condominium projects grow older and more problem-prone,
maintenance needs increase. Many projects will delay maintenance out
of a desire to keep owner assessments low. Other projects will respond

2. State statutes are listed in 1A P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND
PRACTICE app. B-1 (1985). For a relatively current bibliography of condominium literature, see

id. at app. A.
3. See UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT prefatory note, 7 U.L.A. 421-23 (1980).
4. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT, 7 U.L.A. 421 (1980). The pocket part lists the eight states
that have adopted the Act.
5. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT, 7 U.L.A. 231 (1982 & Supp.). So far,
Alaska, Connecticut, and West Virginia have adopted this statute. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.08.010.995 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-200 to -293 (West Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE §§
36B-1-101 to -120 (1986). See Geis, Beyond the Condominium: The Uniform Comnnon-Inerest
Ownership Act, 17 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 757 (1982).
6. See 1, pt. 3 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 2, § 10A-4 (1985); Lawrence, Tort
Liability of a Condominium Unit Owner, 2 Real Est. L.J. 789 (1974); Rohan, Pefecting the
Condominium as a Housing Tool: Innovations in Tort Liability and Insurance, 32 LAW &
CONTEMP.

PROBS. 305 (1967).

7. See 1 P. RoHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 2, §§ 10A-8 to -16.
8. See, e.g., Kremer v. Blissard Management & Realty, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 813 (Ark. 1986);
Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456
(1986); Winston Towers 100 Ass'n v. De Carlo, 481 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986); Carter
v. Willowrun Condominium Ass'n, 179 Ga. App. 257, 345 S.E.2d 924 (1986); Schoondyke v. Heil,
Heil, Smart & Golee, Inc., 89 Ill. App. 3d 640, 411 N.E.2d 1168 (1980); Canterbury Riding
Condominium v. Chesapeake Investors, Inc., 66 Md. App. 635, 505 A.2d 858 (1986); Murphy
v. Yacht Cove Homeowners Assoc., 345 S.E.2d 709 (S.C. 1986); Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d
948 (Tex. 1983); Schwarzmann v. Association of Apartment Owners, 33 Wash. App. 397, 655
P.2d 1177 (1982).
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to growing maintenance needs by cutting costs and services in areas
affecting human safety. Whichever course is taken, the number of tort
claims against condominiums is likely to increase.
Condominium tort liability is a deceptively difficult issue. For the
most part, the difficulty arises from a fundamental conflict between
two models of the condominium. Before lawmakers can satisfactorily
resolve the basic tort liability issues affecting condominiums, they
must understand and accommodate these competing models. One
model is that of the condominium as an aggregate of the individual
unit owners. This aggregate, or shared-services, model views the unit
owners as individual homeowners who have chosen to reduce home
ownership tasks by forming a common organization that provides services to them. Under this model, the common organization, usually
called the unit owners association, has only those responsibilities expressly assigned to it. The association can perform few or many tasks,
as the aggregate of the owners democratically decides. Tasks the
association does not perform remain the responsibility of the individual
unit owners, who bear any legal liability if those tasks are not done.
Because the owners association is merely an alter ego of the unit
owners, the owners remain liable for all of the association's actions.
Moreover, a unit owner cannot complain when the association fails to
perform a task not assigned to it.
The competing model of the condominium is the entity model.
Under this model, the unit owners association has a legal identity
distinct from that of the unit owners and is vested with inherent
powers and obligations. The association under the entity model plays
a role much like that of a landlord, who has interests that conflict
with those of the tenants, and who owes implied legal duties to the
tenants and their guests. In short, the aggregate theory views the
unit owners association as a common services cooperative; the entity
theory views it instead as a public enterprise vested with a public
interest and subject to public regulation.
A hypothetical tort case against a condominium illustrates some of
the differences between these two models. Assume that a condominium
project owns a swimming pool but has no lifeguard. A unit owner's
child drowns in the pool, and the owner sues the association in negligence. Under the aggregate theory, the suit would fail unless the unit
owners expressly agreed to provide the services of a lifeguard. If the
association was not created to provide lifeguard services (or snow
removal services, parldng lot lighting or security guards, as the case
may be), the unit owner could not recover. A third party similarly
injured would also be limited in his ability to sue. The third party
could not expect a level of care greater than that demanded of a
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private land owner, since the unit owners association would have no
existence apart from the individual owners. The third party, therefore,
could recover only if a similar suit would succeed against a private
landowner with a backyard pool. If the third party's suit is meritorious,
all the unit owners would face unlimited personal liability since the
owners association would not provide a liability shield.
Under the entity theory, however, very different consequences
follow from these hypothetical facts. Viewed as an entity, the unit
owners association possesses a distinct legal status, much like that of
a corporate landlord. Having taken on the job of operating a swimming
pool, the association must perform the job in accordance with standards
of reasonable care applicable to other entities engaged in similar operations. The level of required care, then, would be determined by law,
with little regard for the consensus views of the unit owners.
Moreover, if the unit owners association is liable, it would be liable
as a distinct entity in its corporate or quasi-corporate capacity. Under
the entity theory, individual unit owners would have no direct liability
for the entity's tort. Like the shareholders of a corporation and the
partners of a partnership, the unit owners would bear responsibility
for a judgment against the association only to the extent they are
generally liable for the entity's debts.
This illustration only begins to reveal the difficult legal issues that
arise when tort principles are applied to the novel condominium format.
This article flushes out these issues, identifies the connections among
them, and resolves them in a way that does justice to both the property
interests and tort principles at stake. The issues are complex, more
so than legal writers have yet understood. Section II of this article
analyzes problems in the area through the use of a detailed hypothetical
as an illustration. Section III introduces the entity and aggregate
theories at greater length. One overriding lesson emerges from this
section: neither the entity nor the aggregate model fits the condominium particularly well. Yet, a study of the two models helps
refine the issues, helps focus the debates, and ultimately leads to
satisfactory resolutions. This study of the two models also helps
counter what appears to be a natural urge among lawmakers to seize
one model or another to provide a quick answer whenever a complex
liability issue arises. After a brief review of the principal decisions in
the area, the article examines the relevant provisions of the Uniform
Condominium and Common Interest Ownership Acts. In section IV,
the principal policy issues are reconsidered in greater depth and resolutions of each are offered. Finally, section V brings these resolutions
together to form a coherent theory of condominium liability that respects the needs of condominium unit owners while protecting the
legitimate claims of tort victims.
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II.

THE PROBLEMS

A more detailed illustration can help illuminate the difficulties that
arise in applying tort rules to the condominium context. Assume that
a condominium project contains twenty units in a single building together with a parking lot used by unit owners and their guests. The
owners association manages the common area, but does little other
than arrange for grass cutting, occasional cleaning of the common
hallways, and modest, infrequent care of the building exterior and
parking lot. The association controls the common walls and roof of the
building and has created a reserve account for long-term maintenance
expenses. The association is managed by a board of five directors, all
unit owners, who receive no compensation for their work and expend
little effort at it. When the association was first created, the directors
decided not to pay for a snow removal service. The directors reported
this decision to the unit owners, and no owner complained. Aside from
its reserve account for long-term maintenance, the association has
very little money. Under the state condominium statute, the unit
owners, rather than the association, hold title to the common areas
as tenants in common. The association is unincorporated.
On January 1, 1986, a guest of unit owner A slips in the parking
lot on ice that has accumulated for several days, and is seriously injured.
On October 1, 1986, the guest sues the association for damages and
individually names most of the unit owners as co-defendants. During
the spring of 1986, before the suit is filed, unit owner B sells his unit
to P. At the time of the transfer, B knows of the injury and of the
possible suit, but P knows nothing. New owner P is named as a
defendant along with the other unit owners.
The lawsuit by A's injured guest will raise a number of difficult
issues. One is the level of care that is demanded of both the unit
owners, who own the parking lot as tenants-in-common, and the association, which has exclusive rights of control. Assume that under local
decisional law, landlords and businesses must remove snow and ice
from parking lots within a reasonable period of time, while other
private property owners have no such duty. Is the association negligent in failing to remove the ice? Is the association the functional
equivalent of a landlord and therefore charged with this duty, or does
it have no liability for the nonperformance of duties never assigned
to it? As concurrent owners of the parking lot, are the unit owners
liable under the higher standard of care, or is their liability no greater
than that of a private landowner?
The status of the plaintiff raises related and equally troublesome
issues. Will a different result follow if the injured plaintiff is not a
guest of A, but A herself? Might A, as a unit owner, be barred from
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bringing suit because she acquiesced to the decision to provide no
snow removal services? If simple acquiescence is not a bar, might A
be barred if, as one of the directors, she affimatively voted against
a proposal to hire a snow removal service? If A is barred, should the
bar extend to members of A's family and to A's guests?
The suit by A's guest also raises issues relating to the peculiar
status of the unit owners association. Will the association be liable
since it manages the parking lot, or can it escape liability by arguing
that the unit owners, not the association, own the parking lot and
therefore bear the appropriate landowner duties? If the association is
immune from liability for nonfeasance on this ground, is it similarly
immune from suit for misfeasance?
These distinctions may seem minor since the unit owners own the
association as well as the parking lot. But the answers to these questions have considerable consequences. For example, the association
and individual unit owners may have different insurance carriers, or
insurance policies with different coverages and policy limits. Moreover,
if only the unit owners are liable, the plaintiff may be unable to reach
either the association's long-term maintenance reserve account, or its
flow of monthly assessments from unit owners. And, if the plaintiff
sues the owners directly, the owners will incur the costs and psychological trauma of litigation, while the plaintiff will incur the potentially
enormous costs of identifying and serving process on each of the unit
owners.
If only the association is liable, the successful plaintiff will face
collection problems in the absence of adequate insurance. Associations
typically have only limited assets. 9 Their only financial strength is
their ability to make mandatory assessments on the unit owners. Assessments, however, usually require approval of the unit owners,
which might not be forthcoming. 10 State statutes do not grant courts
any express power to order assessments. 1' Moreover, unit owners

9. By definition, a condominium complex is one in which the individual living units are
owned in fee simple by the unit owners and the remaining property is owned concurrently by
the unit owners. See UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-103(7), 7 U.L.A. 434 (1980); 1 P. RoHAN
& M. RESKIN, supra note 2, § 6.01[3].

10. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, 309 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987). In many states
voting and quorum issues are dealt with in the condominium association by-laws rather than
by statute. See 1 P. ROMAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 2, § 5.04.
11. But see UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-117 comment 2, 7 U.L.A. 531 (1980) ("[lIt is

very likely that a court, in a supplemental proceeding on the judgment, would direct the
association to make the necessary assessments against the unit owners.").
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might claim an immunity from liability if, as is often the case, the
association is incorporated.12
Even after a court enters judgment against an association and an
assessment is made, enforcement may be a problem for the plaintiff.
Typically, an association can place a lien on the unit of a delinquent
individual owner and can foreclose to force payment.13 Foreclosure,
however, takes time. More important, association liens are subordinate
to existing liens, which means that an association lien will have little
value if the unit is already mortgaged in an amount equal to its foreclosure sale price.14 If a unit is less heavily mortgaged, an astute or
recalcitrant unit owner might grant a second mortgage, even if only
to a family member, when the prospect of a major assessment lien
seems imminent. 15
However a unit owner is liable, either directly, or only indirectly
through the assessment process, a difficult timing question arises. An
ordinary landowner is liable for a tort at the time that the tort occurs,
and cannot escape liability by selling his land to another. If this rule
is applied to the condominium format, a unit owner's liability is fixed
at the time of the tort. On the other hand, if a unit owner's liability
arises only because he is liable for association assessments, his liability
arises only at the time of the assessment. 16 In such a case, B's sale
to P in the example above would render P liable for the tort judgment
through the assessment process and would allow B to escape liability.
Whatever the outcome of this timing-of-liability issue, more problems arise. If liability arises at the time of assessment, purchaser P
becomes liable. He might feel deceived, of course, and might reasonably claim that B owed him a duty to disclose the possible suit and

12.

See UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-101, 7 U.L.A. 501 (1980); Knight, Incorporationof

Condomi'num Common Areas? An Alternative, 50 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1971); Note, Condominiums:
Inzcorporation of the Common Elements - A Proposal,23 VAND. L. REv. 321 (1970).
13. 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 2, § 6.0 4 [2][a].

14. Condominium statutes often do provide that assessment liens enjoy priority over certain
other liens. An assessment lien, however, will not take priority over a prior mortgage (in some

states, a prior first mortgage), except perhaps if the lien secures an assessment for ordinary
common expenses accruing during the previous six months. Id.; see UNIF. CONDOMINIUm ACT
§ 3-116(b), 7 U.L.A. 527 (1980); infra note 138.
15. A unit owner with adequate personal liability insurance may be less bothered, but an
insurance carrier's duty to pay might be unclear. The insurance policy may cover direct unit

owner liability and not indirect liability through the assessment process. Further, the insurance
carrier may decline coverage on the ground that the insured unit owner has no personal liability
for the debt, or may decline coverage in excess of the amount needed to free the unit from the
real effect of the assessment lien.
16.

See, e.g., UNIT. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 3-115(d), 7 U.L.A. 526 (1980).
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assessment. At the least, P's claim raises difficult issues of misrepresentation. To avoid the assessment, B and his fellow owners might
feel motivated to sell their units. As sales to innocent purchasers
arise, so will misrepresentation claims. On the other hand, P, aware
of the tort and realizing he might face a substantial assessment if he
buys, might decline to buy. If other prospective purchasers are also
aware, the looming tort claim could amount to an effective restraint
on B's ability to alienate his unit.
If liability arises at the time of the tort and P as a post-tort
purchaser is immune from assessment, these particular problems are
replaced by others. The plaintiff will face greater collection difficulties
because some unit owners will have disappeared since the time of the
tort. In addition, the burdens on the association and on other unit
owners might increase. Realistically, the association may only be able
to collect money from unit owners through assessment, and will suffer
harm if P's unit must go unassessed. The association will be compelled
to increase the assessments on other units, and those owners will
suffer.
Still another fundamental liability issue arises from this illustration.
If a unit owner is liable, is he liable only jointly for his proportionate
share of the judgment, or is he also liable severally for the entire
judgment?17 If liability is several, a right of contribution from other
unit owners seems appropriate. But even with a right of contribution,
the burdens of several liability can prove considerable.
State condominium statutes contain surprisingly few answers to
these fundamental questions. Some statutes reject several liability for
unit owners' s and others place a cap on owner liability by ostensibly
limiting liability to the owner's equity in his unit or to the value of
his unit. 19 A few purport to insulate unit owners from all liability,2' 1
but do so in ways that creditors may be able to circumvent. 21 Statutory
answers like these, however, are few and do not comprehensively
resolve the conflicting interests of unit owners and tort claimants.

17. See, e.g., Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. 1983); Note, Judicial Action and
CondominiumUnit OwnerLiability:Public Interest Considerations,1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 255.
18. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.07.260(b) (1986); COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-33-109 (1982); IDAHO
CODE § 55-1515 (1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 183A, § 13 (Law. Co-op. 1987); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 64.32.240 (1966). See generally 4B R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
633.25[2] (P. Rohan ed. 1986); 1, pt. 3 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, sUpra note 2, § 10A.03.
19. See FLA. STAT. § 718.119(2) (1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.80:1(d) (1986).
20. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-9-29 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-16(c) (West Supp.
1986).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 118-19.
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Judicial answers are even less satisfying. One Texas decision rejects
several liability for unit owners.2 A few decisions from other states
conclude that condominium associations, or at least large ones, are
sufficiently equivalent in function to landlords to warrant the imposition of a standard of care similar to the care required of landlords.m
But these decisions and the few others in the area provide answers
that are neither complete nor consistent. The slate, then, is not quite
completely clean, but contains sufficiently few marks that courts and
legislatures can fairly consider this issue as they should consider it from the beginning.
III.

THE COMPETING MODELS OF CONDOMINIUM OWNERSHIP

The numerous issues raised by tort actions against condominiums
can be placed in perspective and made a bit more manageable by tying
them to the two competing models of the condominium. At bottom,
these issues are linked to a single larger question: Should the law
respect the unit owners association as an entity distinct from the
owners and separate in its power and duties; or should the law view
it as a mere extension that neither adds to the owners' duties nor
detracts from their obligations? Current condominium law reflects an
uneasy balance between these two models on issues other than tort
liability. Some provisions reflect an independent, quasi-corporate
status for the association. Other provisions vest ownership and power
in the unit owners personally. On most issues of condominium operations, this uneasy blend creates few problems. But in tort actions
against condominiums, the problems are considerable.
A.

The Condominium Scheme

All common elements in condominium projects are owned by the
unit owners as tenants in common.- Common elements include yards,
parking lots, meeting rooms, athletic and recreational facilities, and
other jointly used property. Common elements also typically include
common walls, roofs, foundations, heating and cooling systems, and

22. See Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. 1983), discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 98-99.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 73-90.
24. 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 2, §§ 5.02, 6.01[3]. This concurrent ownership
of the common elements distinguishes the condominium from the planned unit development, in
which the owners association holds title to the common area. See Country Greens Village One
Owner's Ass'n v. Meyers, 158 Ga. App. 609, 281 S.E.2d 346 (1981).
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electrical wiring.2 In most projects, the unit owners hold only the

interior spaces of their units as separate property. Even the surrounding floors, walls, and ceilings are owned concurrently.

The unit owners, however, possess few of the rights that tile common law vests in tennants in common. A unit owner cannot seek partition of the concurrent property

and cannot transfer or encumber his

share of the common elements except by selling or encumbering his
unit.Y Only the unit owners acting collectively can mortgage the common elements.2 A second limitation on the unit owners as tenants in
common is that statutes or practical necessities require unit owners
to vest management powers over the common elements in an owners
association.2 Through a board of managers or directors, the association
controls all common elements and levies assessments to pay managerial
costs. Membership in the association is mandatory for all unit owners.
The board members are elected by the unit owners.w° Each owner has
a vote that is typically weighted by the value of his unit relative to
the value of all units at the time of condominium creation.31 Many

states allow associations to incorporate as not-for-profit corporations. 2

The board of managers, then, sets important management policies.
The owners collectively have considerable say, however, through the
election and assessment processes. Owners in some states must approve an annual budget, and can disapprove a budget that provides
for too few or too many services.3 Unusual expenditures often require
separate unit owner approval, typically by more than a majority vote.
25.
26.

1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 2, § 6.01[2].
Id. § 8.01.
27. See UNIF. CONDOMINIUm ACT § 3-112 comment 3, 7 U.L.A. 519 (1980).
28. See id.
29. 1 P. RoHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 2, §§ 5.04, 6.02[3]; see UNIF. CONDOMINIUM
ACT § 3-107(a), 7 U.L.A. 514 (1980). Management issues are considered in Hennessey, Condominium Management, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1064 (1974).
30. See, e.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIUm ACT § 3-101, 7 U.L.A. 501 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 30 318.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
31. See Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1543-44
(1982).
32. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, 1 318.1 (Smith-Hurd 1969 & Supp. 1987); Hyatt &
Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and Administration of Condominium and
Home Owners Association, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 920 (1976).
33. See 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 2, § 6.03[2]. Assessment processes are
normally governed by the association's by-laws subject to statutory requirements. See, e.g.,
Sun-Air Estates, Unit 1 v. Manzari, 137 Ariz. 130, 669 P.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1983); Tiffany Plaza
Condominium Ass'n v. Spencer, 416 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982); Papalexiou v. Tower
West Condominium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (1979); Annotation, Expenses for Which
Condominium Association May Assess Unit Owners, 77 A.L.R.3d 1290 (1977).
34. See, e.g., Ralph v. Envoy Point Condominium Ass'n, 455 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, 309(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
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This power to elect board members and vote on budgets and special
assessments gives unit owners a far greater voice in group affairs
than is typically enjoyed, for example, by tenants or corporate
shareholders.
To a large extent, the managerial power of any individual unit
owner is dependent on a practical consideration: the number of units
in the condominium project. No owner can expect much influence in
a 1000-unit complex, just as one voter out of 1000 in a municipal
election has little control. A small condominium project may bear
strong resemblance to a group of family members who jointly manage
a family farm. A large complex, however, takes on more of the characteristics of a political community in which residents voice their concerns only through occasional voting.
In some ways, an owners association is much like a corporation,
with unit owners as the shareholders. In each instance, the managing
directors are elected and enjoy substantial, centralized control once
in office. The association possesses a corporate or quasi-corporate form,
and may sue and contract in its own name. Individual unit owners
have little control, particularly in large projects, and the association
can override the wishes of any single unit owner. The difference
between an association and a corporation, however, are considerable.
A corporation owns its property, has substantial assets, and possesses
no power to levy shareholders for additional capital contributions without their individual consent. The owners association, by contrast, owns
nothing except a modest amount of personal property and possibly a
reserve for future capital expenditures. As a nonprofit entity, the
association lives hand-to-mouth like a governmental body,3 dependent
each year on a continuing flow of mandatory contributions. Because
the association has no income and few assets, it is not an economically
viable entity distinct from the unit owners. An association can contract
and conduct business only because the unit owners back it and are
prepared to cover its debts. In a real sense, the association merely
provides services for the members, and does nothing more.
The owners association can also function much like a landlord. Like
a landlord, the association can enforce numerous covenants restricting
the use of individual units.1 The association maintains and controls

35. For a comparison of condominium and homeowners associations with governmental
bodies, see Ellickson, supra note 31; Hyatt, Condominium and Home Owner Associations:
Formation and Development, 24 EMORY L.J. 977, 981-84 (1975).
36. See 1, pt. 3 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supranote 2, at ch. 10; Hyatt & Rhoads, &Upra
note 32, at 918; Note, The Rule of Law in ResidentialAssociations, 99 HARv. L. REv. 472 (1985).
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the common areas as does a landlord. Like a tenant, a unit owner
displeased with the level of maintenance or safety can only complain
and hope for the best. But this comparison, like the corporate comparison, is far from complete. Unlike an association, a landlord is separate
from the tenants and has distinct interests and goals. A landlord's
goal is to make money, and a landlord will cut services and capital
expenditures if and when it is profitable to do so. When rental space
is in high demand, landlords enjoy considerable market power and can
force tenants to accept ill-maintained and unsafe property. Excessive
landlord influence motivated courts to impose the mandatory implied
warranty of habitability on residential landlords.3 1 In the case of an
association, these conflicts are absent.
In short, the unit owners association is sui generis, an odd breed.
When compared to recognized business entities, there are many
similarities. Yet there are considerable similarities as well between
the owners association and an aggregate of individuals. Not surprisingly, condominium law is pulled in both directions.
B. The Duty of Care
The entity and aggregate models provide differing guidance on the
level-of-care issue. As an entity, an owners association logically should
shoulder the same duties of care imposed on landlords and businesses.
In most states, those duties considerably exceed the duties of care
imposed on private landowners, which control under the aggregate
model.
At common law, a landowner's duties to third parties depended
upon whether a third party was an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser.3
The landowner owed few duties to a trespasser. To a licensee the
landowner owed duties to use reasonable care in his actions on the
property and to warn of known hidden dangers. To an invitee, the
landowner owed a duty to make the property reasonably safe. Social
guests of a private landowner were considered licensees, not invitees,
which meant that the private landowner had no obligation to correct
patent dangers, and no obligation to search for hidden dangers un-

37. See Freyfogle, The Installment Land Contract as Lease: HabitabilityProtections and
the Low-Income Purchaser, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 297-99 (1987); Mallor, The Implied
Warranty of Habitabilityand the "Non-Merchant" Landlord, 22 DUQ. L. REV. 637 (1984).
38. See 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMEs, & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS ch. 27 (2d ed. 1986);
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 58, 60, 61 (f. Keeton 5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
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known to him. Consistent with this rule, a private landowner had no
obligation to remove snow and ice or to correct other obvious dangers.
Landlords and other business landowners faced greater duties at
common law since their visitors were considered invitees.3 9 The landowner owed a duty to invitees to correct known defects within a
reasonable period of time and to take reasonable steps to locate and
remedy latent dangers. Much depended, then, on the status of the
landowner relative to the third party. A social guest visiting a tenant
was an invitee while walking down a common hallway. The same guest
visiting a private homeowner was merely a licensee and was therefore
due a lesser standard of care.
In recent years the tripartite categorization of third parties has
lost favor among lawmakers. 40 Many states have abolished the distinctions, particulary the licensee/invitee distinction, and require landowners to exercise due care under the circumstances to safeguard all third
parties. Landlords and business proprietors, however, are still held
to a higher duty. In gauging the level of care that is due, courts still
view the guest's social or business status as an important factor. A
landowner who entertains third parties for business purposes is expected to render greater care. Tenants and their guests are viewed
as business customers of the landlord when they enter common areas
that remain under the landlord's control.
The decline of the tripartite classification makes the care levels of
various landowners less distinct, but does not automatically reduce
the gap between business and private landowners. Indeed, the gap
between private homeowners and landlords is in fact widening in many
states today. Landlords in many jurisdictions now have a duty to
protect tenants and guests from forcible criminal misconduct by third
parties, a duty not imposed on private homeowners.41 Moreover, commercial landlords in California are now strictly liable to residential
tenants and their guests injured as a result of latent defects that exist

39. See F. HARPER, F. JAmES, & 0. GRAY, supra note 38, § 27.17; PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 38, §§ 61, 63; cf. Hiller v. Harsh, 100 Il. App. 3d 332, 426 N.E.2d 960 (1981)
(landlord owes reasonable care to tenant's licensees and invitees because they are lawfully on
premises); Murray v. Lane, 51 Md. App. 597, 444 A.2d 1069 (1982) (both licensees and invitees

of tenant are considered invitees of landlord).
40.

PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, § 62; Note, The Illinois Premises Liability Act:

A New Approach to the Determinationof a Landowners Liability, 34 DE PAUL L. REV. 689
(1985). See, e.g., Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn. 1984).
41. See Note, Landlord Liabilityfor Crimes Committed by Third PartiesAgainst Tenants
on the Premises, 38 VAND. L. REV. 431 (1985); Comment, Business Inviters' Duty to Protect
Invitees from Criminal Acts, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 883 (1986).
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in the premises at the beginning of the lease.4 This strict liability
doctrine has materially expanded the landlord's common law duties
and imposes on him a duty that exceeds by a considerable margin the
private homeowner's duty to warn of latent defects. The gap between
the two duties will widen further if California extends the strict liability duty to latent defects that arise after the commencement of the
lease.
C.

Suits by Condominium Unit Owners

The entity or aggregate status of an owners association also considerably affects a unit owner's ability to sue for tortious misconduct.
At common law, members of an unincorporated association could not
sue the association.4 Under the joint principal rule, all members of
an association were equally responsible for associational torts4 4 and
the negligence of one member was attributed to all others. Since an
injured member was equally responsible for his own injury, he could
not sue his fellow members. The joint principal rule also applied to
partners and concurrent owners. In each case, the various individuals
were responsible for one another.
A related rule also barred suits against unincorporated associations,
including concurrent property owners. At common law, an unincorporated association was not considered a "jural entity" with an existence
separate from its members. 45 Lacking entity status, the association
could not be sued; instead, the plaintiff was required to sue the members or co-owners personally.
In recent decades the joint principal and jural entity rules have
partially eroded. Members of large unincorporated associations with
distinct existences, such as labor unions and fraternal lodges, can now
bring suit against the organizations. 4 6 For informal groups and concur-

42. See Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
43. See Developments in the Law - Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,
76 HARv. L. REv. 983, 1089 (1963) [hereinafter Developments]. For discussion of procedural
problems presented by suits involving unincorporated associations, see Brunson, Some Problems
Presented by UnincorporatedAssociations in Civil Procedure, 7 S.C. L.Q. 394 (1955).
44. See H. OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS
74 (3d ed. 1974); Developments, supra note 43, 1089-92; 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations and Clubs

§ 31 (1963).
45. See H. OLECK, supra note 44, § 303; Developments, supra note 43, at 1081; Sturges,
UnincorporatedAssociation as Parties to Actions, 33 YALE L.J. 383 (1924); 6 Am. Jur. 2d
Associations and Clubs §§ 1, 43, 48, 51, 54 (1963).
46. See Marshall v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 57 Cal. 2d
781, 371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1962); O'Bryant v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 176 Ind.
App. 509, 376 N.E.2d 521 (Ct. App. 1978); Diluzo v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers,
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rent property owners, however, both rules are still in effect. Both
the joint principal and jural entity rules reflect a premise that co-owners of property do not create a viable, responsible entity simply by
holding title to property as tenants in common. Even if the co-owners
assume a name and refer to themselves collectively by a single term,
they have created nothing of legal significance.
In some ways, the entity model seems the better analogy on this
issue. Owners associations often operate as not-for-profit corporations,
and some state statutes expressly vest even unincorporated associations with the same powers held by such corporations. 47 Other statutes
expressly grant associations broad power.4 These provisions strongly
suggest that associations should qualify as jural entities. But these
statutes give little indication they were drafted with tort liability in
mind, and the association's jural status is still uncertain when a tort
action is involved. An owners association by statute manages the common property, but it is the unit owners who own the common property
and have ultimate control over the association. At common law landowners' duties are not subject to delegation. 49 Arguably, then, a statute
vesting management duties in the association delegates power but not
legal responsibility. If a tort arises from nonfeasance, the landowners
at common law remain liable, regardless of any delegation.

Local 274, 386 Mass. 314, 435 N.E.2d 1027 (1982); Tanner v. Columbus Lodge No. 11, Loyal
Order of Moose, 44 Ohio St. 2d 49, 337 N.E.2d 625 (1975); H. OLECK, supa note 44, at 81-82.
47. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30 318.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); UNIF. CONDOAMINIUMt AcT § 3-102, 7 U.L.A. 501-02 (1980).
48. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 183A, § 10 (Law. Co-op 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
46:8B-15 (west Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.80 (1986).
49. 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES, & 0. GRAY, supra note 38, at 85-88. An owner of land can
avoid the duties of landowners by turning possession and control of the property over to another
person, at least so long as the other person is not the landowner's servant. Thus, a landowner
is largely not responsible for the condition of premises leased to a tenant. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 38, § 63. A landowner is also not responsible for land turned over to an independent
contractor, but this is true only if the contractor has full possession and control. See, e.g., Hodge
v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga. 1969), affd, 424 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1970) (Georgia
law); Darling v. Burrone Bros., 162 Conn. 187, 292 A.2d 912 (1972); Okleshen v. Rune & Sons,
117 Ill. App. 2d 244, 254 N.E.2d 554 (1969); Merritt v. Nickelson, 407 Mich. 544, 287 N.W.2d
178 (1980); 5 F. HARPER, F. JAmES, & 0. GRAY, supra note 38, § 26.11; 65 C.J.S. Negligence
§ 92 (1966). The doctrine of contractor independence, however, has its limits. See, e.g., Improved
Benevolent & Protected Order of Elks, Inc. v. Delano, 308 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975)
(landowner and independent contractor are jointly liable when both know of a defect and fail
to correct it); Glass v. Freeman, 430 Pa. 21, 240 A.2d 825 (1968) (landowner must exercise
reasonable care to prevent a third party on the land from creating an unreasonable hazard if
the landowner can control the third party and recognizes the need to do so); 5 F. HARPER, F.
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On the other hand, the aggregate model, with its joint principal
and jural entity rules, seems more applicable when the unit owners
in a small project jointly and deliberately fail to perform a safety-related task, such as the installation of new locks on common doors or
safety lighting in a parldng lot. A single family homeowner who made
this decision could not later sue himself in negligence. When a few
neighboring landowners make the decision jointly perhaps they too
should be bound by their decision. Unfairness seems to arise only
when unit owners who dissent are bound to collective decisions.5°
D.

The Extent and Timing of Unit Owner Liability

The common law jural entity rule also considerably affects the
liability of a unit owner for torts committed on common property and
torts committed by association agents. When the aggregate model is
followed and the jural entity rule applied, individual unit owners are
generally liable for tortious misconduct arising out of condominium
activities. For torts relating to the common property, unit owners'
liability arises directly from their status as landowners. When an association agent or employee commits the tort, the owners' liability
arises directly as members and owners of the association.sl Under the
aggregate model, then, owners are personally liable for association
torts. The aggregate model also provides a clear rule on the timing
of owner liability. Since liability is direct, it arises at the time of the
tort, and an owner cannot escape liability by later transferring his unit.

JAMES, & 0. GRAY, supra note 38, at 88-93 (landowner liable if independent contractor engages
in inherently dangerous activities). Moreover, a landowner is vicariously liable if the contractor
is considered the landowner's "servant." See id. § 26.3. The landowner may also be independently
liable for negligence in selecting the contractor or in providing poor guidance. Id. at 80-82.
Finally, a landowner is liable if a task or duty has not been delegated to the independent
contractor. Id. at 81.
50. Even when dissenters arise, however, the aggregate model still has value. An injured
unit owner could be allowed to sue the other unit owners, even if the association lacked jural
capacity and could not be sued. That is, a state could retain the jural entity rule and drop the
joint principal rule. Whatever route is taken, states should analyze the joint principal and jural
entity issues separately since the two issues raise differing concerns.
51. Generally, members of an association today are personally liable for a tort if they
authorized, ratified, or participated in the tortious acts. See H. FORD, UNINCORPORATED
NON-PROFIT ASSOCIATIONS 51-69 (1959); Developments, supra note 43; 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations and Clubs § 48 (1963). Many courts, however, using vicarious liability language, hold
association members personally liable for any act or omission by the association or one of its
agents when the act or omission was within the scope of the purposes for which the organization
was formed. See, e.g., Fast v. Kahan, 206 Kan. 682, 481 P.2d 958 (1971).
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The entity model supplies different rules. The corporation and the
partnership provide useful illustrations of the entity model and its
characteristics. A corporate shareholder has no personal liability for
corporate debts. The shareholder can, however, lose his investment
in the corporation, which means he is effectively liable with other
shareholders for his pro-rata share of corporate debts to the extent
of his investment. That liability arises at an imprecise point in time.
If the shareholder sells his stock after a tortious act has occurred, he
has eliminated his liability, but he has still suffered a loss if he receives
a lower sale price because of the prospect of a tort judgment. In the
case of a well-known tort injury, the market may discount the stock
price immediately by the full amount of the expected judgment. The
shareholder's liability, then, occurs at the time of the injury. If the
tort injury is unknown, the stock price may remain unaffected until
the time of judgment, and liability would thus occur at this later date.
For a partnership, the rules are slightly more varied. Limited
partners are treated essentially the same as corporate shareholders. 52
General partners, however, are fully liable for partnership debts.
Their liability attaches when the tort occurs and is unaffected by a
later sale of the interest, since the purchaser is not personally liable
for obligations arising before he enters the partnership.5 A general
partner's share of partnership assets can be seized by tort claimants,
however, which means, practically speaking, that an incoming general
partner may lose his investment as a result of a prior tortious act.
An incoming general partner, therefore, is in much the same position
as an incoming limited partner and an incoming corporate shareholder.
On the timing issue, then, the entity model provides a somewhat
flexible answer: An owner's liability effectively arises when the judgment is paid, unless the market discounts the share price in anticipation
of the judgment. A post-tort purchaser thus incurs a loss if he buys
without knowing of the prospective judgment. The entity model provides a clearer rule on the extent of an owner's liability: An individual
owner of an entity is not personally liable for entity debts, and stands

52.

See REV. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303, 6 U.L.A. 282 (Supp. 1987); H.

REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP

§ 264 (1979).
53. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1914); REV. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 403, 6 U.L.A. 300 (Supp. 1987); H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 52,
§ 206.
154. See UNIP. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 17, 6 U.L.A. 207 (1914); REV. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 403, 6 U.L.A. 300 (Supp. 1987).
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to lose only his investment in the entity. The general partner, of
course, provides an exception to both rules since he has agreed to a
form of ownership that expressly provides for personal liability.
Moreover, owners of smaller corporations must often co-sign corporate

notes and personally guarantee corporate debts as a condition of doing
business, and underfunded corporations at times have their corporate

forms pierced by courts. But these deviations do not materially detract
from the normal rule of limited owner liability.6
E.

Joint Versus Joint and Several Liability

Finally, the entity and aggregate models differ on whether unit
owners should share tort liability jointly or whether they should face
several liability. Under the aggregate model, owners are considered

55. Although the entity model provides a clear rule on the extent and timing of individual
owner liability, the rule is difficult to apply to condominium cases because of the peculiarities
of the condominium form. The entity model provides that a unit owner has no direct liability
for association torts but does stand to lose his investment in the entity. In some cases, however,
an owner agrees to make future capital contributions to an entity, in which case his investment
is deemed to include the promised future payments. Creditors of a corporation can force a
shareholder to make good on a contributed promissory note or on an agreement to purchase
more stock or supply more capital. Partners are bound by similar promises. Promises of this
type are enforceabie even if the entity has control over the timing and amount of the contribution.
The question arises, then, whether a condominium unit owner's promise to pay future assessments is akin to a corporate shareholder's promise to contribute additional capital.
Although the issue is a difficult one, the corporate-shareholder analogy on balance seems
inapt. Creditors of corporatlons and partnerships can enforce only unequivocal, binding promises
made by shareholders and partners. A creditor can enforce a promise only if the entity could
do so without the shareholder's or partner's consent. In the case of a condominium, all assessments need prior unit owner approval. Assessments to meet annual budgetary needs typically
require majority approval. Special assessments often require greater consent. But a condominium
can always dissolve and terminate all duties to pay further assessments. Moreover, a dissenting
unit owner is free to sell his unit if he dislikes forthcoming assessments. These voluntary
elements to the assessment process provide a critical distinction. Partners and corporate shareholders can always agree to supply additional capital for entity purposes, but courts and creditors
cannot force them to do so absent their prior consent. The entity model, in sum, suggests that
unit owners should stand to lose only their prior contributions and already agreed-upon future
contributions.
If this view of the assessment process is accepted, an incoming unit owner under the entity
model should have no liability for major assessments to fund a tort judgment. As a consequence,
individual units should remain freely alienable during the pendency of a tort claim. Future
assessments might be higher if a tort creditor seizes the few assets that an association typically
maintains. But if the entity model is strictly followed, creditors should be unable to reach the
flow of future assessments that are earmarked for other purposes.
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joint tortfeasors sharing joint and several liability at common law.56
When liability is several, one joint tortfeasor usually has a right of
5 7
contribution from the other joint tortfeasors.
Under the entity model, individual unit owners are liable only to
the extent of their past and promised future contributions to the
entity. When a creditor seizes entity assets, the loss is suffered by
the owners in accordance with their proportionate contributions. These
contributions are likely to equal, or at least approximate, the relative
ownership shares of the owners. The tort liability is therefore borne
jointly by the members.
F.

The Underlying Policy Choices

The aggregate and entity models reflect significantly different and
competing policy concerns. The aggregate model favors full liability
and full recovery for jointly committed acts of misfeasance and nonfeasance. It reflects a belief that individuals should not be able to reduce
their risk exposure by simply banding together for joint conduct. It
also reflects a belief that, as between an injured plaintiff and a joint
tortfeasor, equity favors the former, and a joint tortfeasor should be
unable to reduce his liability by shifting blame to his co-culprits. If
equity favors a division of liability, the paying defendants should be
left to argue among themselves in later actions for contribution. If
one defendant is insolvent, the other defendants should suffer the loss,
not the plaintiff.
The entity model sacrifices full compensation in favor of several
competing concerns. By limiting liability, the entity model reduces
investor risk and thereby stimulates investment in economic enterprises. It enables entities to bring together enormous resources from
individual investors who might otherwise be unwilling to risk all their
assets in a venture with co-investors whom they did not know or
trust. The entity model also aids and stimulates investment by facilitating transfers of investment units. Purchasers who risk only their investments are less likely to move cautiously and to ask detailed questions. When the pool of purchasers is larger, resales are easier, and
investors are more likely to participate in the first instance.

56.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 878 (1977); 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES, & 0.

GRAY, supra note 38, § 10.1, at 1-2, 14; see, e.g., Morden v. Mullins, 115 Ga. App. 92, 153
S.E.2d 629 (1967) (tenants in common each owe duties of care to third parties even though
actual management of property is vested by agreement exclusively in one of the co-tenants).
57. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES, & 0. GRAY, supra note 38, § 10.2; PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 38, § 50; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1977).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

19

Florida Law
Review, Vol.
Iss. 4 [1987], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW39,
REVIEW

[Vol. 39

The entity model also is justified by the diminished control investors have in large organizations and the increased harshness of several
liability on a single small investor. As the size of an entity increases,
the individual is more distant from decisionmaking. Investors must
sacrifice all managerial control if they want the benefits of limited
liability under corporate and partnership law. 8 These laws thus make
explicit the tradeoff between control and limited liability.
Finally, the entity model recognizes that as the size of an entity
increases, limited liability is likely to cause fewer problems for tort
claimants. As entity assets grow, tort claims present less of a cash
drain, and fewer tort claimants are likely to suffer from the lack of
investor personal liability.
Quite clearly, the condominium is neither an aggregate nor an
entity, and neither model provides complete guidance. As discussed
in section IV, state courts have tended to seize on one model or the
other to answer particular liability questions. In doing so, they have
failed to appreciate the condominium's hybrid nature. State lawmakers
must assess the conflicting policy considerations, see the sharp clash
between the entity and aggregate models, and appreciate how and
why each model is inapplicable to the condominium. As discussed
below, the policy considerations favor a blend of the two models. It
is a blend, however, that is dominated by the aggregate model.
IV.

THE EXISTING LAW

Current law on condominium tort liability is erratic and unsatisfactory. The dozen or so full judicial decisions in the area lack mature
assessments of the conflicting policy considerations and do not achieve
harmonious results. Among the state statutes, those modeled after
the Uniform Condominium Act contain the most detailed guidance.
That Act, however, leaves important issues unresolved and seemingly
shortchanges weighty policy concerns.
A. JudicialEfforts
Condominium tort liability first reached the appellate courts in a
1971 California decision, White v. Cox,59 which involved a unit owner's

58. See REV. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303, 6 U.L.A. 282 (Supp. 1987); H. HENN
& J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES §§ 146,
202, 218, 230 (3d ed. 1983).
59. 17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1971); see Note, Condominium Unit Owner
Has Standing to Sue Unincorporated Unit Owners' Associationfor Injuries Inflicted Because
of Association's Negligence, 25 VAND. L. REV. 271 (1972).
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claim that an association negligently maintained a water sprinkler in
a common area.6 The plaintiff owned one unit of sixty, and brought
his action solely against the association.1 The primary issue in White
was whether the unit owner could sue the association despite the joint
principal rule.6 2 The court allowed the suit, citing a civil procedure
code section authorizing suits by and against unincorporated associations,63 and a line of California decisions allowing member suits against
labor unions and fraternal lodges.r4 On a policy level, the court determined that a sixty-unit condominium association, like a labor union,
has a separate existence from its members and is sufficiently large
that a single owner has no direct control over the management pro-

cess.
In a footnote, the court considered the personal liability of unit
owners for a judgment against an association.66 As guidance on the

issue, the court found only a California statute that allowed an owner
whose unit was encumbered by a blanket lien to remove his unit from
the lien by paying his proportionate share of the secured debt. 67 This
statute "implied," the court intimated, that an association judgment
is a common expense for which each owner is liable only pro rata.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Roth examined the issue of unit owner
liability in more detail.69 He disagreed that the lien removal had any
bearing. The telling point, he urged, was the unit owners' status as

tenants in common. As tenants in common, they would be liable jointly

60. White, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
61. Id. at 830, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
62. See id. at 826, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 259-60.
63. Id. at 830, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338 (West 1973)).
64. Id. at 826-27, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
65. Id. at 828-30, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 262-63.
66. Id. at 830 n.3, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 263 n.3.
67. Id. (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 1357 (West 1982) (currently CAL. CIV. CODE § 1369
(West Supp. 1986)).
68. Id. at 830 n.3, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 263 n.3. The court ignored conflicting precedent,
precedent of which the court was obviously aware. One California decision, cited elsewhere in
the opinion, held that members of an unincorporated association have no liability for acts of the
association unless they authorized or performed the acts. Orser v. George [sic], 252 Cal. App.
2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967), cited in White, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 827, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
Moreover, a provision in the California Corporation Code stated that a creditor of an unincorporated association cannot levy upon the property of the members of the association. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 24002 (West Supp. 1986), cited in White, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 827, 95 Cal. Rptr.
at 261. For reasons not clear, the court ignored these authorities in its footnote on individual
unit owner liability.
69. White, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 831, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64 (Roth, J., concurring).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1987], Art. 2

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

and severally for all injuries arising out of the common areas. Given
this direct liability for the full amount of a judgment, there was little
reason to attach much importance to a statutory provision limiting
the owner's indirect liability through the association.70
White v. Cox remains the leading decision on the ability of a unit
owner to sue an association. Aside from a recent, similar ruling by
the South Carolina Supreme Court 7 1 other decisions have simply assumed that such suits are permissibleY2
The liability issue courts have faced most often is the level-of-care
issue. In a 1978 decision, a Florida appellate court considered whether
an association had a duty to provide a trained, full-time lifeguard for
the safety of a unit lessee.7 The court concluded the association owed
a duty to exercise "ordinary care," which was the duty applicable to
a "private swimming pool" and less than the duty "applicable to a
place providing public entertainment or amusement for profit." 74 The
court recognized that differing levels of care could be imposed, and
suggested a low level of care was appropriate. Yet, by turning to the
"ordinary care" standard, the court chose the standard applied to
business invitees at common law, not to licensees.7 Moreover, the
court borrowed reasoning from cases defining landlord liability,
thereby suggesting that condominium associations owed the same
duties as a landlord. 6 Knowingly or otherwise, the court applied a
level of care well above the level owed by private landowners, and
extended this duty to condominium guests as well as to unit owners.

70.
71.

Id. at 832, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
Murphy v. Yacht Cove Homeowners Ass'n, 289 S.C. 367, 345 S.E.2d 709 (1986) (unit

owner can sue association in tort and is not barred by joint principal rule).
72. See Kremer v. Blissard Management & Realty, Inc., 289 Ark. 419, 771 S.W.2d 813
(1986); Winston Towers 100 Ass'n v. De Carlo, 481 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986); Admiral's
Port Condominium Ass'n v. Feldman, 426 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983); Janke v. Corinthian
Gardens, Inc., 405 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979); Hemispheres Condominium Ass'n v.
Corbin, 357 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978); Carter v. Willowrun Condominium Ass'n, 179

Ga. App. 257, 345 S.E.2d 924 (1986); Murphy v. D'Youville Condominium Ass'n, 175 Ga. App.
156, 333 S.E.2d 1 (1985); Schoondyke v. Hel, Hel, Smart & Golee, Inc., 89 Ill.
App. 3d 640,

411 N.E.2d 1168 (1980). Pratt v. Maryland Farms Condominium Phase 1, Inc., 42 Md. App.
632, 402 A.2d 105 (1979) may provide a further example, but it is not certain from the opinion
whether the unit owners association was the defendant.
73.
74.

Corbin, 357 So. 2d at 1074.
Id. at 1076.

75.

See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.

76. Corbin, 357 So. 2d at 1076 (citing Manassa v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 332 So. 2d 34
(Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976); Smith v. Jung, 241 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1970)).
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Other courts have also relied on precedent defining landlord's liability when establishing an association's duty of care.7 In Frances T.
8 a recent ruling by the California
v. Village Green Owners Association,7
Supreme Court, a unit owner in a 600-unit project sued the association
for failure to provide exterior safety lighting in the vicinity of the
plaintiffs unit. The plaintiff and other unit owners had complained of
the lack of adequate lighting, and at the time of plaintiffs injury, the
79
association was studying the problem and soliciting unit owner views.
The plaintiffs first claim alleged common law negligence in the maintenance of the common areas 4 ' The plaintiff also alleged that the association had breached its "contract" with the unit owners by failing to
perform adequately the duties assigned to it by the owners. 8'
Paradoxically, the court upheld the negligence claim and rejected
the contract claim.m The association had adequately performed the
task assigned to it by the unit owners 8 But the association, in the
court's view, was the functional equivalent of a landlord, and therefore
owed the full range of landlord duties to the unit owners. Only the
association was in a position to maintain and secure the common areas,
while the individual owners lacked any meaningful control. The association could not successfully defend on the ground that, unlike a
landlord, it had limited funds and could not significantly increase its
budget without the approval of a majority of the members.84
The decision in Frances T. raises difficult questions. The court
concluded, in essence, that the association adequately performed the
duties it had agreed to perform, yet failed to meet higher standards
of conduct somehow imposed by common law. The association in
Frances T. was studying the lighting problem at the time of plaintiffs

77. In Carter v. Willowrun Condominium Ass'n, 179 Ga. App. 257, 345 S.E.2d 924 (1986),
the court asserted summarily that the tenant of a condominium unit was not a business invitee
of the condominium association. The case involved defamation, however, rather than a land-

owner's duties to care for his property. By denying the tenant's claim for invitee status, the
court suggested that unit owners and their guests were not entitled to the higher protections
owed to business invitees. Id.
78. 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986).
79. Id. at 496-98, 723 P.2d at 575-76, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 458-59.
80. Id. at 498, 723 P.2d at 576, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
81. Id. at 512, 723 P.2d at 586, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 469. Plaintiff also claimed breach of
fiduciary duty, which the court ruled failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 513-14, 723 P.2d
at 587, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
82. Id. at 511-13, 723 P.2d at 586, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
83. Id. at 512-13, 723 P.2d at 587, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
84. Id. at 499-503, 723 P.2d at 576-79, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 459-62.
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injury. What if the association had recommended security lighting,
only to have the measure voted down by the unit owners? By the
court's logic, the association would still be liable, just as a landlord
presumably is liable even if he can prove that his tenants are not
inclined to pay higher rent to cover the higher lighting costs. In
FrancesT., the court deprived the unit owners of the chance to decide
collectively they wanted no extra lighting. In doing so, the court
glossed over the many differences between a landlord and a unit owners association.
In Moody v. Cawdrey & Associates,s6 the Hawaii Court of Appeals
borrowed California precedent to decide that an association has the
same duties as a landlord.Y As in Frances T., the issue was the duty
to protect against foreseeable criminal attacks. 8 In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Burns took a different tack. 9 There was scant evidence, he argued, that condominium owners and their guests needed
the courts to intervene and protect them against the actions of an
association. Rather, the owners should have the option to decide they
do not want the bother and expense of extensive security protection.
When persons consider buying a condominium apartment,
they can easily determine what kind, if any, of security devices, services, and improvements are needed and provided.
If they are dissatisfied with the existing situation, they
should not make the purchase. If after they purchase they
think more or better devices, services, and improvements
are necessary, then as voting members of the association
they can attempt to convince the association's other voting
members and board to have them provided. °

85. See id. at 519-20, 723 P.2d at 591-95, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 475-78 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting) (exploring some of the differences between association and landlord in provision

of security protections for residents).
86.

721 P.2d 708 (Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 721 P.2d 707 (Haw. 1986) (reversing

on ground that neither an association nor a landlord owed a duty to protect against criminal
conduct by third parties; no discussion of whether association owed a lower duty of care than
a landlord). The landlord level of care was also applied in Olar v. Schroit, 202 Cal. Rptr. 457
(Ct. App. 1984) (official opinion deleted by Cal. Supreme Court) and Pratt v. Maryland Farms
Condominium Phase 1, Inc., 42 Md. App. 632, 402 A.2d 105 (1979).
87. Moody, 721 P.2d at 716.
88. Id. at 713.
89. Frances T., 721 P.2d at 716 (Burns, C.J., concurring).
90. Id. at 717 n.3.
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The only opinion to pursue rigorously a line of thinking that focuses
on the managerial obligations undertaken by an association is Schoondyke v. Heil, Heil, Smart & Golee, Inc.9 1 In that case, an owner's
child slipped on ice that had accumulated on a common sidewalk.
Although under local law residential landowners had no duty to remove
natural accumulations of snow and ice,9 the defendant association undertook this task in the condominium declaration and by-laws. Having
assumed the task, it was liable to both injured third parties and unit
owners in performing the task.9 3 The court described the action as
"negligence arising from a breach of a contractual duty."' But the
court emphatically denied that only a unit owner - a party to the
contract - could sue for its breach. Once a duty was taken on, contractual privity was irrelevant.9 5 Significantly, the action against the
association involved nonfeasance rather than misfeasance; therefore,
the well-established "Good Samaritan" rule did not apply.
No reported decision discussing an association's duty of care has
considered a small complex with a high level of individual unit owner
control. Moreover, no decision has considered a situation in which unit
owners have instructed an association to forego a safety measure that
would have prevented the plaintiffs injury. These cases, if and when
they arise, may force courts to consider more seriously Judge Burns's
concurrence in Moody. Although Schoondyke pursues a contractual
argument, it does so only to extend the association's duties beyond
the duties imposed by common law. As Judge Burns suggests, however, the contractual argument could as easily justify a reduction in
common law duties, at least in the case of unit-owner plaintiffs. At
the least, the contract-based analysis reveals the deficiencies of the
landlord-entity analogy, and suggests that courts err when they simply
seize on the entity model to provide a quick resolution to the difficult
level-of-care issue.
A third issue, the possible liability of individual unit owners as
tenants in common, reached the courts recently in Davert v. Larson.9

91.

89 Ill.
App. 3d 640, 411 N.E.2d 1168 (1980).

92. See, e.g., Tressler v. Winfield Village Co-op, 134 Ill.
App. 3d 578, 481 N.E.2d 75 (1985);
Lewis v. W.F. Smith & Co., 71 Ill.
App. 3d 1032, 390 N.E.2d 39 (1979). Lewis arose before
the enactment of ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, 202 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (effective 1979)
(owner who voluntarily removes snow and ice is not liable for resulting injuries in absence of
willful or wanton misconduct).
93. Schoondyke, 89 Ill.
App. 3d at 645, 411 N.E.2d at 1172.
94. Id. at 642, 411 N.E.2d at 1170.
95. Id. at 643, 411 N.E.2d at 1171.
96. 163 Cal. App. 3d 407, 209 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1985). Although the opinion is not clear on
the point, Dave'rt may have involved a property arrangement other than a condominium. The
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In Davert, the defendant owned only one unit in a 2500-unit project.
Nonetheless, the court held the defendant personally and directly liable, despite the lack of any control by the defendant over the association's actionsY7 The association that controlled the common areas
was not a party to the suit, and the court therefore did not consider
how this individual liability fit together with the association's liability
for the same injury.
A fourth issue, whether an owner's liability is several, has arisen
in only a single case. In Dutcherv. Owens,"5 the Texas Supreme Court
decided that a unit owner was "vicariously liable" for an association's
negligence. The Dutcher court, as have other courts, noted the lack
of meaningful control possessed by a single unit owner. This lack of
control, in the court's view, justified limiting the unit owner's liability
to only joint liability. The unit owners, the court reasoned, were liable
only jointly for common expenses; similarly, they should be liable only
jointly for tort judgments."
B. The Uniform Condominium Act
The above decisions and the few others like them are analytically
unsatisfying. In comparing the association to a landlord, courts have
seized on the entity model without understanding- why it is a poor

common elements, however, were owned by the property owners as tenants in common, and
an unincorporated property owners association managed the property. Thus, the arrangement,
if not a condominium, was functionally identical to it and would, presumably, be governed by
identical rules.
A related issue arose in Schwarzman v. Association of Apartment Owners, 33 Wash. App.
397, 655 P.2d 1177 (1982). There, the court dismissed a unit owner's action against the directors
of an association for tortious misconduct. The dismissal was based in part on a state statute
specifying that tort actions could be maintained only against the association. The court interpreted
the statute literally to bar suits against members. The case involved an action against the
directors for a business decision made by them, and did not relate to the duties of the unit
owners as tenants in common. Id.
97. Davert, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 412, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
98. 647 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. 1983); see Note, Condominium Unit Owner Tort Liability: Owens
v. Dutcher, 35 BAYLOR L. REv. 189 (1983); Note, supra note 17.
99. Dutcher, 647 S.W.2d at 950. Dutcherrejected the common law presumption that tenants
in common are severally as well as jointly liable. Aside from Dutcher, the only judicial mention
of the issue lies in a concurring opinion in White, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 832 n.2, 95 Cal. Rptr. at
264 n.2 (Roth, J., concurring), where Justice Roth noted that tenants in common in California
generally are held to joint and several liability. Id. Although California courts have yet to decide
the issue, the opinion in Davert, upholding direct actions against unit owners, suggests that
California courts stand prepared to apply common law rules rigorously in the absence of statutory
guidance. Joint and several liability, it would seem, may soon follow in California.
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analogy. By drawing on the common law rules governing tenants in
common, courts have turned to the aggregate model. Again, however,
they have done so without understanding why the aggregate model
also provides an incomplete comparison.
Statutory drafters in various states have not achieved more complete or satisfying results. The best sustained consideration of the
subject is contained in the Uniform Condominium Act. 1 ' In 1982, the
relevant provisions of this proposed statute were incorporated without
material change into the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act.' 01
A dozen states have now adopted one or the other of these acts. Their
provisions and attendant difficulties are therefore worth close examination.
Under Section 3-107 of the Uniform Act, the association has full
responsibility for maintaining the common areas, unless the declaration
creating the condominium diminishes these duties. 10 2 Under Section
3-113, the association must maintain liability insurance covering the
common areas. 10 That insurance, however, need only be in an amount
chosen by the managing directors.'0 Moreover, if insurance is not
"reasonably available," the association can function without it, but
must notify the unit owners of this fact. 10 5 In the case of nonresidential
condominiums, the insurance duties contained in the Act can be varied
or even waived.106 If an association does obtain liability insurance, the
policy must name each unit owner as an insured party with respect
to the owner's liability "arising out of his interest in the common
'
elements or membership in the association. 107
Section 3-111 of the Act deals directly but incompletely with tort
liability.108 The section explicitly authorizes unit owners to sue an
association. -ne section also provides that "an action alleging a wrong
done by the association must be brought against the association and

100.

UNIF. CONDOMINIUm ACT §§ 3-111, -113, -115(d), -117, 7 U.L.A. 517, 520-22, 526,

530 (1980). A model act developed by the Condominium Research Institute is discussed in Rohan,
The "Model Condominium Code" - A Blueprint for Modernizing Condomiriurm Legislation,
78 COLUm. L. REV. 587 (1978).
101. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP AcT §§ 3-111, -113, -115(d), -117, 7 U.L.A.
341, 344-46, 350, 356 (1982).
102. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 3-107(a), 7 U.L.A. 514 (1980).

103. Id. § 3-113(a)(2), 7 U.L.A., at 521.
104. The managing directors, however, cannot choose an amount less than any minimum
amount specified in the condominium declaration. Id.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. § 3-113(c), 7 U.L.A., at 521.
Id. § 3-113(i), 7 U.L.A., at 522.
Id. § 3-113(d)(1), 7 U.L.A., at 521.
UNIF. CONDOMINIm ACT § 3-111, 7 U.L.A. 517 (1980).
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not against any unit owner."109 The comment explains that the section

"changes the law in states where plaintiffs are forced to name individual unit owners as the real parties in interest to any action brought
against the association."' 110 Once a tort claimant obtains a judgment
against an association, that judgment under section 3-117 becomes a
lien on all of the units in the condominium project at the time the
judgment was entered."

Section 3-117 further provides that "[n]o

other property of a unit owner is subject to the claims of creditors of
the association." A unit owner subject to such a lien can remove the

lien by paying his pro-rata share of the judgment. 12 After the owner
does so, "the association may not assess or have a lien against that

unit owner's unit for any portion of the common expenses incurred in

3
connection with that lien."1
These various provisions at first glance seem to provide four clear
rules for guidance: (1) a plaintiff can sue only the association; (2) a
unit owner will be liable for his pro-rata share of a judgment; (3) a

unit owner's liability will be limited to the value of his unit; and (4)
a unit owner can escape lien difficulties and further liability by paying
his pro-rata share at an early stage in the dispute. All four rules are
characteristic of the entity model.
Although facially clear, these four rules break down and create
problems when considered more closely. The primary problem with
the Act is that it does not clearly bar direct actions against unit owners
based on their tenancy-in-common status (as in Davert), and may not

even eliminate their vicarious liability for association actions (as in
4
Dutcher)."1
The Act provision requiring suits against the association

109.
110.

Id.
Id. comment 1.

111. UNIF. CONDOMINIUm ACT § 3-117(a), 7 U.L.A. 530 (1980). This provision is emphasized by § 3-115(d), which states that an assessment to pay a judgment against the association
"may be made only against the units in the condominium at the time the judgment was entered,
in proportion to their common expense liabilities." Id. § 3-115(d), 7 U.L.A., at 526.
112. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-117(c), 7 U.L.A. 530 (1980).
113. Id.
114. But see Schwarzman v. Association of Apartment Owners, 33 Wash. App. 397, 655
P.2d 1177 (1982) (interpreting similar Washington statute to bar suits against unit owners sued
in their capacity as directors). For discussion of Schwarzman, see supra note 96.
Unit owners perhaps could argue that they should owe no duties as concurrent landowners
because they have turned management duties over to the association. This argument, however,
is at odds with established rules governing landowner duties. A landowner cannot simply avoid
duties to third parties by hiring a management agency. A landowner can escape liability only
by turning full possession and control over to a third party. See, e.g., Quinlivan v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 395 Mich. 244, 235 N.W.2d 732 (1975); sources and cases cited supra note
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is limited on its face to tortious actions and inactions by an association,115 and has no clear application to tortious failings of the tenants
in common. If this interpretation of section 3-111 is correct and unit
owners can be sued directly as tenants in common, they may face
several as well as joint liability. This development, of course, would
undercut the Act's apparent preference for pro-rata liability only. It
would also undercut the Act's attempt to limit an owner's liability to
the value of his unit.
Even if section 3-111 bars a direct suit against unit owners, an
owner may be forced to pay more than his share of the judgment,
and may be forced to pay out of "other property" he owns. A longer
comment to section 3-117 of the Common Interest Ownership Act
notes that a judgment lien against a unit will often go unsatisfied if,
because of existing liens, the owner's equity in the unit is less than
his pro-rata share of the judgment.116 The judgment creditor will then
be left with an uncollected portion of the judgment. In a parenthetical,
the comment notes that if a judgment creditor cannot collect directly
from the unit owners, the "creditor may... satisfy his judgment in
full by reaching the income stream of the association by appropriate
creditor process. '"1 7
In light of this parenthetical comment, the limited liability scheme
under the Uniform Act may provide less protection for unit owners
than first appears. If a creditor can seize all of an association's assets
and its flow of income from unit owners, the association will have no
choice but to increase assessments or cease operations.118 If halting

49. In the condominium setting, unit owners retain full possession and use of the property, and
have the power collectively to control the association. It is unlikely, therefore, that the unit
owners can escape their duties. Of course, if the association is not a jural entity, the tenants
in common will be fully liable. Moreover, even if the association is a jural entity and the unit
owners are not liable for association debts, the unit owners may be vicariously liable because
the association is not a sufficiently independent contractor. See supra note 49.
115. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-111, 7 U.L.A. 517 (1980).
116. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP AcT § 3-117 comment 2, 7 U.L.A. 357-58
(1982).
117. Id.
118. It is hard to imagine how courts can implement sensibly the provision in the Uniform
Common Interest Ownership Act that allows a unit owner to remove the judgment lien from
his unit by paying his pro-rata share and that prohibits an association from further assessing
the unit owner for the judgment. See id. § 117(a)(3), 7 U.L.A., at 356; see also UNIF. CONDOIINIUM ACT § 3-117(c), 7 U.L.A. 530 (1980) (substantially identical provision). What if
several unit owners do not pay and the creditor then seizes the association's assets, halting the
association's activities? Read literally, the association can only replenish these assets by collecting
from the unit owners who have not paid. But what if it cannot do so? Is bankruptcy really the
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operations is not feasible, the association will be forced to assess and
reassess until it has sufficient funds to pay the judgment. In making
these additional assessments, the association will not be limited by
the value of each unit or the amount of an owner's equity. The association will continue assessing until it has enough money to pay the
judgment. When some unit owners fail to pay, the association will
increase assessments against others and they will pay more than their
pro-rata shares of the judgment. In short, an individual owner may
in the end pay far more than his pro-rata share, and will pay these
additional amounts out of "other property" he owns.
A unit owner, therefore, can take advantage of the statutory provision barring creditors from seizing "other property of a unit owner"
only if he gives up his unit. An owner who walks away can thus
successfully avoid liability on any subsequent liens and assessments.
When this happens, the loss the owner has avoided may shift to the
first mortgagee or to a foreclosure sale purchaser. When an owner
abandons his unit, the mortgagee will foreclose. The foreclosure sale
will eliminate the junior judgment lien and any liens to pay judgment
assessments. However, the foreclosure sale purchaser (often the
mortgagee) automatically becomes an association member. As a
member, the purchaser will be subject to further demands by the
association to help pay the unsatisfied judgment. If these assessments
are unpaid, they will become liens on the unit, replacing the judgment
lien and assessment liens removed by the foreclosure. Thus, the foreclosure sale purchaser will escape liability for the judgment only if
other unit owners in the interim have satisfied the judgment.
If the foreclosure sale purchaser is aware of the possible judgment
lien at the time of the sale, he may discount his purchase price accordingly. A lower foreclosure sale price would shift the loss back to the
mortgagee (if a different person) since the foreclosure sale would bring
less than the amount of the mortgage debt. The mortgagee, in turn,
may have a deficiency judgment against the defaulting unit owner if
deficiencies are allowed under local law. Deficiency judgment in hand,
the mortgagee can compel the unit owner to pay, with the payment,
of course, coming from the unit owner's other property.

only option? More important, if the association receives more money from regular assessments,
the creditor can still seize the money. When this happens, the association will have involuntarily
violated this provision. In fact, the provision can be enforced only if it restricts the actions of
both the association and the judgment creditor. This problem is avoided by the liability scheme
proposed below. See infra Conclusion 6: Unit Owner Liability at text following note 137.
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The Uniform Act, then, does not effectively limit the liability of
unit owners. If, despite section 3-117, a tort claimant can sue an owner
directly, the limited liability scheme fails quickly. If a direct action is
not permissible, the limited liability scheme only fails more slowly as
the creditor hounds the association and the association in turn repeatedly seeks money from the unit owners. Even if an association
incorporates, the limited liability scheme may fail. The creditor could
still reach the flow of contributions to the association and render the
association financially helpless. Assuming this result is unacceptable
to the unit owners, they will be compelled to fund the association
sufficiently to satisfy the judgment. Indirectly, then, the unit owners
must pay the debt even of an incorporated association.
The same result holds true in states that purport to insulate unit
owners from all liability for association torts. A unit owner is not
truly insulated unless his future payments to the association are immune from creditor seizure. If the creditor can seize the flow of assessments and effectively bring association operations to a halt, the unit
owners will have no recourse. Realistically, they must pay off the
judgment in some manner, unless they are prepared to end the condominium project and sell or partition the condominium's assets.
Fundamentally, the problem with the Uniform Act's limited liability
scheme is that a creditor can circumvent it through the vigorous exercise of his right to seize the association's assets. Typically, a condominium project cannot operate without a unit owners association.
Unless an association somehow can declare bankruptcy and rid itself
of its unpaid judgment debt, it can never escape the debt. The creditor
will freeze its bank accounts, seize its assessments, and otherwise
bring operations to a halt. In some way, the unit owners will be
required to pay the debt - unless, that is, they all agree to turn the
entire project over to the creditor and all walk away. The association
may borrow money to pay the judgment, and then repay the loan
through future assessments. Unit owners may lose their units through
foreclosure, and new owners may step forward to help pay off the
judgment. But whether new or old, equally or unequally, the unit
owners will be compelled to pay.
These problems with the Uniform Act are perhaps sufficient to
suggest that the Act is seriously flawed, but the Act is subject to yet
further difficulties. One is its failure to discuss the important level-ofcare issue. This issue, presumably, is left to tort law, which is not
supplanted by the Act. 119 The omission, however, is significant. Other

119.

UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-108, 7 U.L.A. 449 (1980).
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difficulties relate to the elements of unfairness that the Act creates.
One unit owner may have equity in his unit that exceeds his share of
the judgment. Realistically, he must pay his full share of the judgment
or suffer a greater loss through foreclosure. A second unit owner, by
contrast, may have little or no equity in his unit. He may be willing
to abandon his unit to avoid paying the judgment. If he abandons,
other unit owners may be required to pay more than their original
shares of the judgment. The unfairness of unequal payments can be
even greater for a post-tort purchaser of a unit. A tort claimant's
judgment becomes a lien on units in the complex at the time of the
judgment. Therefore, a purchaser who buys a unit at any time before
the judgment is fully liable. Even a post-judgment purchaser can suffer
if he buys and enters the association while the creditor's collection
efforts are still continuing.
The Uniform Act, in sum, seems to adopt an entity approach, but
does so unsuccessfully. The Act requires suits to be brought against
the unit owners, but in a way that may create problems. It unsuccessfully limits a unit owner's liability to his pre-existing investment in
the condominium. Finally, it unsuccessfully limits a unit owner's liability to his pro-rata share of the judgment. The Act succeeds, but only
partially, on the timing of unit owner liability. When an action is
brought only against the association, unit owner liability is delayed
until the time of judgment, and pre-judgment sellers of units can
escape. This possibility, however, raises the prospect of serious misrepresentation claims if a purchaser joins a project in ignorance of an
upcoming judgment, as well as that of a serious restraint on alienation
if disclosure takes place.
V. THE POLICY ISSUES REVISITED
To develop a satisfying format for resolving condominium tort disputes, it is helpful to reconsider in a more organized manner the basic
policy conflicts. The entity-aggregate conflict is useful because it focuses attention on the principal underlying policy choices. The judicial
and legislative steps taken to date are also useful, despite their gaps
and inconsistencies, for they highlight some of the hazards and pitfalls
the condominium form of ownership creates.
A.

Control and Responsibility

A strong theme that emerges from a study of the entity-aggregate
conflict is the established link between individual control and responsibility. Across the spectrum, from small tenancy in common relationships to large public corporations, individual control and individual
liability are closely tied. Generally, the greater a person's control over
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decisions, the more legal responsibility he must take for the consequences. 120 In unincorporated groups, a member's ability to sue the
association arises when it is sufficiently large, and the member's control is sufficiently slight, to justify the imposition of jural entity status
on the association.121 So, too, a member's liability in tort declines as
the size of the association increases since the member is liable only
for torts he participated in, authorized, or ratified.12 In partnership
law the link is explicit. A partner who seeks limited liability must
relinquish nearly all elements of control.m In corporations, shareholders have no liability unless they participate in corporate management
as officers or directors.'?
In condominium projects the control continuum is smooth and unbroken. Control declines, step by step, as size increases. To be consistent with existing precedent from other areas of law, diminished control should bring diminished unit owner liability. The Texas Supreme
Court in Dutcher recognized this link by concluding that unit owners
who lack meaningful control should face only joint liability.1m
Two problems arise, however, in applying this control-liability linkage to the condominium context. One is the difficulty of drawing
lines. Meaningful control does not end abruptly when a condominium
project reaches a certain size; any line will be artificial. A greater
problem is the association's lack of financial independence. An association is not an ongoing business with assets and revenues to cover
prospective expenses. By its very nature, an association is financially
irresponsible. Without adequate insurance, it will always be unable
to satisfy a substantial adverse judgment. A state can mandate liability
insurance, and associations with sufficient insurance can avoid most
knotty liability issues. But fair liability minimums are difficult to draft,
as many states have realized.1 26 However written, liability rules and
policies inevitably have limits. When insurance limits are exceeded,

120. See supra text accompanying notes 43-55.
121. See supra text accompanying note 46.
122. See supra note 51.
123. See REv. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303(a), 6 U.L.A. 282 (Supp. 1987).
124. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 58, §§ 218, 230.
125. Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1983).
126. See UNIF. CONDOMINIum ACT § 3-113(a)(2), 7 U.L.A. 521 (1980) (allowing the directors to set the amount of the 'mandatory" liability insurance, subject only to any minimum
required by the declaration); cf. id. § 3-113(a)(1), 7 U.L.A., at 520-21 (requiring mandatory
property insurance in an amount "not less than 80 percent of the actual cash value of the insured
property at the time the insurance is purchased and at each renewal date, exclusive of land,
excavations, foundations and other items normally excluded from property policies").
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courts must allocate legal responsibility to provide plaintiffs with a
fair chance of recovery. Entities should serve as liability shields .only
if they are financially competent to do so.
When an underinsured association provides inadequate recovery,
the plaintiff in some manner must look to the assets of unit owners
for satisfaction. Whatever the timing of individual unit owner liability,
some unit owner liability seems necessary in fairness to injured plaintiffs. The unit owners, after all, are the users of the common areas
and the beneficiaries of the association's actions.
In short, the condominium's nature presents three distinct characteristics that must weigh heavily. First, an association is financially
irresponsible. Second, condominium projects vary considerably in size,
from small to large, and any line-drawing based on size is perforce
artificial. Third, in most condominium projects an individual will have
sufficiently little control that barring him from complaining of an association's tortious conduct will be unfair. As discussed below, a unit
owner might lack the power to counteract an association's decision to
forego extraordinary safety and security measures. But he should be
able to complain (and recover) if an association fails to perform
adequately the tasks expressly assigned to it.
These characteristics and the concerns underlying them support
three important conclusions:
(1) Unit Owner's Ability to Sue. A condominium unit owner should
be able to sue the association for tortious misconduct causing him
injury, regardless of the size of the condominium project. The joint
principal rule should not apply, and courts should not try to distinguish
among condominiums based on size.
(2) Joint Liability. Because of their relative lack of control, unit
owners should face only joint liability for association torts. Greater
liability might fairly fall on an owner who caused or committed the
tort, but several liability is unfair for an owner unconnected with the
tort.
(3) Personal Liability of Unit Owners. Given the financial irresponsibility of associations, some personal liability for unit owners is
necessary if plaintiffs are to have a fair chance of recovery.
B.

The Morality of Unit Owner Consent

A second issue that arises from a study of the entity-aggregate
conflict is unit owner consent to a particular level of safety or maintenance. Through a more or less democratic process, unit owners direct
the actions of their associations. By electing managers, approving
annual budgets, and voting on special assessments, unit owners express their consent to a particular level of common services. The
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question for lawmakers is the extent to which this democratic consent
process should be respected. Should a unit owner, whether or not he
voted with the majority, be bound by the majority's wishes, or should
lawmakers step in and establish minimum standards of safety and
services that all associations must provide?
When a unit owner sues the association, a possible approach for
courts is to distinguish between approving and disapproving unit owners and to respect the wishes of the majority only if the plaintiff voted
with the majority. A unit owner who disapproved an association action
or inaction would not be bound by it. This approach has theoretical
appeal, but in practice its application would create enormous complications. Only in rare cases will a plaintiff have expressly approved or
disapproved a particular association decision. Often, the issue will be
whether a unit owner approved a decision to forego a particular service
or security measure by voting for a budget that omitted the item.
Even if a unit owner is aware of the budgetary omission and disapproves it, he may nonetheless vote in favor of the budget. It is even
more difficult to determine consent if the unit owner failed to vote,
or voted affirmatively and then complained of the action.
On balance, a distinction between consenting and nonconsenting
unit owners is unworkable in practice and can be rejected on that
basis alone. The distinction also would result in varying standards of
care owed to various unit owners - an awkward and displeasing
result. Further, the distinction does not help determine standards of
care owed to third parties.
It makes little sense, then, to enforce the consent of unit owners
on an owner-by-owner basis. But it does make sense to enforce the
consensual wishes of the majority and to apply the majority-chosen
standard across the board. Quite often safety measures are not an
unmitigated good, even apart from their cost. A lock on the front
door of an apartment building adds an extra element of safety within
the common corridors. But it also adds an element of inconvenience.m
Visitors and delivery people are locked out along with the muggers,
and newspapers, mail, and packages must be left outside the building
rather than at doorsteps. Tenants must struggle with extra keys, and
perhaps pay the cost of buzzer systems and intercoms. If most or all
unit owners in the project favor convenience over safety, should the
law interject?

127.

See, e.g., Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (unit owner sued

association seeking removal of locks placed on exterior entrance ways).
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Once again, the landlord analogy provides a useful comparison.
Courts today routinely impose safety-related duties on landlords without regard to landlord or tenant wishes. The reasons for this are
several, but one central reason surely is the tenant's lack of control
over safety and maintenance decisions. A landlord has little incentive
to increase safety standards unless they somehow aid marketing efforts. A tenant, of course, personally benefits by better safety, but
has little incentive to undertake safety measures at personal expense.
A lease may be short, and the benefits may inure to future tenants.
For obvious reasons, tenants cannot feasibly be expected to spend
their own money on greater safety precautions. The tenant who wants
more safety has no realistic option other than to move, if moving is
in fact an option.
In the condominium context, however, the realities are different,
and to a meaningful degree. No landlord with adverse interests rules
the roost. Associations are but mirrors of the owners' interests. In a
sense associations are the functional equivalent of a landlord, but only
in that each homeowner is his own landlord. In contrast to a tenant,
the unit owner has much greater influence - as much influence, in
fact, as any other person. By banding together and agreeing to democratic rule, a unit owner loses much of his individual control, but
enough remains to meaningfully distinguish the unit owner from the
tenant.m
The landlord analogy is inapt as well because unit owners, unlike
tenants, do receive the full benefit of new safety measures. The property rights of unit owners are permanent and transferable. A unit
owner who pays his share of new lighting owns a pro-rata share of
it. If the lighting serves a useful purpose and is worth the cost, an
incentive for action is present that is absent for the typical tenant.
As several commentators have observed, a private residential community is like a small democratic political community. 2 9 At some point,
lawmakers must decide whether they will respect the independence
of the community and grant it discretion. They must decide whether
the wisdom of parking lot lighting for a particular residential community is a matter best decided by a court or legislature, or by the
community members themselves. When the structure of ownership
deprives the community members of adequate choice, as in the landlord-tenant setting, courts can properly intervene to set minimum

128. See generally Ellickson, supra note 31 (using the voluntary nature of the owner's
participation to distinguish the homeowners association from a municipality).
129. See, e.g., id. at 1521-26; Note, supra note 36.
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safety and maintenance standards. But when structural impediments
are absent, justifications for intervention largely disappear.
Fundamentally, the issue becomes simply one of whether a unit
owner should be obliged to submit to the wishes of the majority. In
certain circumstances, of course, he should not. A unit owner clearly
should have the right to demand that the association and the unit
owners respect certain minimum levels of care and safety when managing the common areas. Public policy requires all landowners to
adhere to minimum safety standards, even as regards trespassers.
But this line of reasoning only justifies minimum safety standards. It
does not explain why unit owners should face higher care duties than
other private residential owners. It does not justify a distinction between owners of single family homes and owners of condominiums.
In each case, the law can and should impose minimum duties. In each
case, the owners have the option to employ higher levels of care.
Absent countervailing concerns, unit owners should be allowed to exercise that option.
If unit owners demand more of their association, they should have
the right to sue based on the voluntarily assigned duties. An association should bear liability if it fails to perform an assigned task or
performs it poorly. But it makes little sense to hold, as in Frances
T., that an association has performed its job adequately and yet still
faces liability.
These considerations, then, lead to a further conclusion:
(4) Duty of Care. An association should be bound by the standards
of care applicable to a private landowner. In addition, it should be
bound to perform without negligence any higher duties and standards
of care assigned to it by the unit owners.
C. Free Alienability and Fairness
By all appearances, courts and legislatures have overlooked the
restraints on alienation that pending tort actions can generate. They
have dealt almost as poorly with the issue of fairness that arises when
unit owners try to avoid a possible assessment by selling their units
after a tort occurs. Finally, they have ignored the alienation problems
and equity concerns that can arise when creditors attach the flow of
assessments to an association.
The common law has long evidenced a dislike of restraints on the
alienation of real property. 13 0 Restraints cause personal turmoil and
130. See R. CUNNINGHADI, W. STOEBUCK, & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
35-36 (1984); Volkmer, The Application of the Restraintson AlienationDoctrineto Real Property
Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REV. 747 (1973).
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inhibit the economically efficient and productive use of land. A tort
action that threatens to exceed insurance coverages can amount to a
substantial restraint. That restraint is partially removed if the unit
owners are personally liable for a tort at the time of the injury and
subsequent purchasers are immune from liability. But the restraint is
wholly removed only if a purchaser's unit, his assets, and his assessment payments are all removed from creditor action. A purchaser
must be immune, not just from personal liability, but from any assessments that will be used to pay the judgment.
Any other approach can create substantial insurance problems for
both existing and prospective unit owners. If a unit owner is liable
only through the assessment process, he may be unable to recover
under his insurance policy. The insurer at the time of the injury may
deny coverage since liability did not attach at that time. The insurer
at the time of the assessment, possibly a different company, might
also deny coverage on the ground that the loss preceded the policy
commencement. If word of the pending assessment leaks out, a unit
owner may have difficulty obtaining or renewing coverage. Recovery
from an insurance carrier may prove especially difficult for a post-tort
purchaser who had no coverage at the time of the tort. And again, a
purchaser's difficulty in obtaining adequate insurance would further
diminish the alienability of units.
Aside from these alienability matters, lawmakers crafting a liability
scheme also should consider seriously the post-tort purchaser's possible
claim for nondisclosure of a pending tort claim. Although this problem
may seem premature, the case can and will arise, and its resolution
should bear on the allocation of liability in the first instance. In the
area of real estate sales, misrepresentation law is in the midst of a
major transformation. 131 Gone or going are many of the elements of
the misrepresentation action that once severely limited a deceived
person's chance of recovery. 132 Seller scienter requirements are much
less rigorous.1 3 Buyers of property can more readily rely on seller

131.

See Freyfogle, Real Estate Sales and the New Implied Warranty of Lawful Use, 71

CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5-25 (1985).

132. Under traditional misrepresentation law a plaintiff was required to prove (1) a false
statement of fact by the defendant; (2) the defendant's knowledge that the statement was false
(or some similar scienter); (3) an intent to induce reliance by the plaintiff; and (4) actual,
justifiable reliance causing damage to the plaintiff. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, § 105,
at 728.
133. See id. §§ 107-09; Freyfogle, supra note 131, at 18 n.68; James & Gray, Misrepresentation - Part I, 37 MD. L. REV. 826, 296-322 (1977).
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misstatements. T Most important, sellers in many jurisdictions must
disclose all material matters of which they are aware that affect the
desirability of the property that they sell. 1 5 Caveat emptor is fast

fading, if not largely gone.
Under many condominium statutes purchasers can demand a statement from the association providing certain material information, including a description of pending suits.136 Remedies for nondisclosure,

however, are unclear. A purchaser could sue the seller, but the disclosure obligation is often imposed on the association, not the seller.
Equally difficult issues arise when statutory disclosure duties do not
apply. Must a seller disclose a past tort that might lead to liability
for the purchaser, or will the seller be liable only for affirmative
misrepresentations? Many states will impose such a disclosure duty;
in other states, predictions are more difficult. If no disclosure duty
exists, purchasers will suffer unfairly, and the liability scheme will
create a trap for the unwary (if not the wary) purchaser. If a disclosure
duty does exist, on the other hand, purchasers either will refuse to
buy or will negotiate a lower price. If a unit becomes unsaleable, the
tort claim has effectively restrained alienation.
On the issue of disclosure of a tort problem to a purchaser, then,
three principal results are possible: (1) the purchaser will be unaware
of the risk and suffer an unfair loss by buying at full price; (2) the
purchaser will know the risk and refuse to buy, thus hampering alienability; or (3) the purchaser will know of the risk and reduce his purchase
price accordingly. Of these three, only the third is palatable. The first
is unacceptable because of its unfairness; the second because of the
social and economic costs of inalienability.
The best way to avoid these fairness and alienability problems is
to impose the liability risks on the seller and leave them there. If the
seller bears the loss, then these problems all disappear. This solution
is similar to the third of the above three outcomes, but the uncertainty
element is eliminated. The seller and purchaser need not speculate

134. See, e.g., Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608 (Alaska 1980); Freyfogle, supra note
131, at 12-13. But see, e.g., Smith v. Ethell, 144 Ill. App. 3d 171, 494 N.E.2d 864 (1986)
(reaffirming strict buyer inquiry duties).
135. See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985); Freyfogle, supra note 131, at
25-28.
136. See, e.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 4-109(a)(8), 7 U.L.A. 549 (1980). The Act

requires the seller to provide the statement, but the statement is to contain information obtained
from the association. The seller is not liable for erroneous information provided by the association.
Id. § 4-109(b), 7 U.L.A., at 549.
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and dicker over the dollar value of the pending risk, a process that
can be expensive both in transaction costs and mental anguish. 137 These
considerations, then, lead to two further conclusions:
(5) Timing of Liability. A unit owner's liability should be fixed at
the time of the tort because this rule best overcomes alienability and
fairness concerns.
(6) Unit Owner Liability. The unit owners personally should bear
sole liability for any tort judgment not covered by insurance. The
association's assets and flow of future assessments should be immune
from creditor action. This conclusion may seem extreme, particularly
in the case of a tort intentionally committed by an association agent.
But only this rule avoids the turmoil and impasses that can develop
when a creditor pursues vigorous collection efforts.
D.

The Unit Owner's Investment

Modern condominium statutes, particularly the uniform acts, lean
heavily toward the entity model. Under the entity model, an owner
is liable only pro-rata for his share of a tort judgment and only to the
extent of his investment in the enterprise. The uniform acts attempt,
albeit unsuccessfully, to mimic this approach by analogizing a condominium unit to a share of corporate stock. A unit owner, the acts
suggest, enjoys a corporate shareholder's limited liability, since the
unit, rather than its owner, is subject to direct creditor action.
The uniform acts do not successfully impose this harsh restriction
on creditors. This failure is fortunate, for limited liability would be
unfair to creditors and unit owners alike. A condominium unit will
almost always be subject to prior liens, and it is the existence of these
liens that can lead to the unfairness. If a corporation suffers an insurmountable loss, its stock will lose value and the shareholders will lose
their investments. It is immaterial whether a shareholder's stock is
pledged or encumbered. In the condominium setting, existing
mortgages are superior to judgment and assessment liens, which

137.

In one limited respect the Uniform Condominium Act does reflect a concern for alien-

ability and fairness issues. Two provisions of the Act reflect a recognition that a tort judgment
might adversely affect the expansion of condominium complexes and might unfairly impose
liability on owners of units added to a complex. Section 3-117(a) provides that a judgment lien
attaches only to units in existence at the time of the judgment. Id. 3-117(a), 7 U.L.A., at 530.
Section 3-115(d) provides similarly that any assessment made to fund a judgment can be made

only against units in the complex at the time of the judgment. Id. § 3-117(d), 7 U.L.A., at 530.
Thus, units added after the judgment are immune. Units are not immune, however, if they
were added after a tort but before any judgment. More significant is the Act's curious concern
over owners of new units given its relative lack of concern for purchasers of existing units.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss4/2

40

Freyfogle:
A Comprehensive
Theory of Condominium Tort Liability
CONDOMINIUM
TORT LIABILITY

realistically attach only to an owner's equity. 13 That equity is subject
to manipulation by the owner. Among owners of comparable units,
equities can vary considerably depending on the amount of debt secured by each unit.
Owners of comparable units should face comparable liability. The
owner with more equity might legitimately feel cheated if faced with
an inexplicable, higher loss. A tort claimant might also feel unfairly
treated if, as he prosecutes his claim, his recovery fund is diminished
bit by bit, as owner after owner adds a second or third lien or increases
a first. In the extreme, of course, even a large condominium complex
may have no value if the units are all fully encumbered.
A state wanting to follow rigorously the corporate-entity comparison would need to expose each unit owner to liability in relation to
the value of his unit, rather than the value of his equity. A creditor
could then seize any of the unit owner's assets so long as their value
did not exceed the value of the condominium unit. This approach would
eliminate the unfairness that arises when a state limits liability based
on the value of an owner's equity. It also better duplicates the corporate shareholder analogy since a corporate shareholder can lose his
stock and still remain liable for debt incurred to purchase the stock.
But this approach can lead to annoying disputes over the value of a
unit. A foreclosure sale could resolve the argument, but foreclosure
is a harsh resolution mechanism. A state could achieve the same general result in a less troubling manner by placing an arbitrary cap say $100,000 - on each unit owner's liability. An arbitrary cap would
avoid disputes over the value of a unit. Moreover, a fixed dollar cap

138. Under both the Uniform Condominium and Uniform Common Interest Ownership Acts,
judgment liens enjoy no special priority and would be, presumably, inferior to all existing liens.
See UNIF. CONDOMINIUm ACT § 3-117, 7 U.L.A. 530 (1980); UNIF. COMMON INTEREST
ONVNERSHIP AcT § 3-117, 7 U.L.A. 356 (1982). Assessment liens, on the other hand, have
priority over all liens except liens created before the condominium declaration was filed, first
mortgages, mechanics' liens, and tax and governmental assessment liens. Moreover, the assessment lien has priority over a first mortgage to the extent of the regular budgetary assessments
that become due during the six months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce
the assessment lien. See UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-116, 7 U.L.A. 527-28 (1980); UNIF.
COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116, 7 U.L.A. 351-54 (1982). Thus, an assessment
lien is superior to all second mortgages, while a judgment lien is inferior to second mortgages
that are earlier recorded. Thus, in the ease of a unit encumbered by a second mortgage, a
judgment creditor might benefit by foregoing enforcement of his lien and asking the association
to levy and then enforce an assessment of equal amount. The creditor would benefit by a higher
lien priority; the association would benefit if the creditor collects and the judgment is thereby
partially paid.
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is only marginally more arbitrary than a cap based on the value of a
unit, since neither amount bears any relationship to the plaintiffs loss.
Any cap, however, is arbitrary - whether based on unit owner
equity, unit value, or fixed dollar amount - and the reason for such
a cap is not readily apparent. A cap of any type is presumably motivated by concerns of fairness to a unit owner. In part, a cap attempts
to limit a unit owner's liability to his pro-rata share of the judgment.
Additionally, it protects the unit owner against catastrophic loss. The
former concern has merit, but is more easily implemented by a ban
on several liability. The latter concern may also have merit, but there
are problems with it. Owners of single family dwellings face similar
sizeable losses, yet the law does nothing to protect them. Moreover,
it is hard to rationalize unit owner protection at the expense of an
injured, innocent plaintiff. A cap on liability will simply encourage
unit owners to limit their insurance coverages and may reduce, if only
marginally, incentives to protect against tortious injuries.
These concerns support the above conclusion on joint liability (Conclusion 2: Joint Liability) and a further conclusion:
(7) Cap on Unit Owner Liability. A unit owner's liability should
not be limited by either the value of his equity or the value of his
unit. Little justification exists for any type of liability cap, but a state
that sets one should do so in fixed dollar terms.
E.

The Ability to Settle

Many of the above concerns would be diminished appreciably if a
unit owner could settle clearly and early. Under the pure aggregate
model, such settlement is easy. Under the entity model, particularly
as implemented by the Uniform Condominium Act, it is not.
Under the aggregate model, a unit owner is personally liable for
a tort but the association is immune. Once a unit owner settles, he is
free of further concern. His association interest is freely transferable,
and he can pay future assessments to the association without fear
they will be seized. Under the entity model, however, a unit owner
who settles and pays his share of a judgment is not immune from
further loss so long as the creditor can reach the association's assets.
The owner might face an additional assessment expressly levied by
the association to pay the judgment. Even if an express assessment
is ruled out, 139 the association could still increase regular assessments

139. See, e.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-117(c), 7 U.L.A. 530 (1980), discussed supra
note 118.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss4/2

42

Freyfogle: A Comprehensive Theory of Condominium Tort Liability
CONDOMINIUM TORT LIABILITY

to keep the association afloat and replenish bank accounts seized by
the creditor. A unit owner under the Uniform Condominium Act is
never immune from further demands to pay until the entire judgment
is paid off.
Both unit owners and creditors benefit when a reliable settlement
process is available. Courts also benefit since settlement avoids litigation. These settlement concerns lend further justification for two of
the conclusions reached above. Settlement is easiest when a unit
owner's liability arises and is fixed at the time of the tort (Conclusion
5: Timing of Liability) and when only the unit owners (and not the
association) are liable (Conclusion 6: Unit Owner Liability). Only then
can a unit owner, soon after a tort occurs, settle the claim and eliminate
all future troubles.
F.

The Responsible Association

A final policy concern is one that is more public in nature than the
preceding concerns. Under the entity model, and particularly under
the Uniform Condominium Act, a judgment creditor can bring an
association to its knees by freezing an association's bank accounts,
which will halt operations while the association tries to raise money
to pay the judgment. While an impasse like this continues, an association's maintenance and safety operations could end, its employees
could depart, and near havoc could rule. The unit owners will be the
first to suffer, but the public may suffer as well. The public is ill
served when security guards walk off the job, insurance and utility
bills go unpaid, grass goes uncut, and valuable residences become
inalienable.
The rub, of course, is that an association provides essential services
and yet is financially irresponsible. The problem is easily overcome
by imposing liability solely on the unit owners (Conclusion 6: Unit
Owner Liability). An association could be required to maintain liability
insurance, and be liable to the extent of its insurance. The association
could even be required to set up a special escrow account to fund
judgments. But indefinite liability too easily leads to confusion and
disruption.
For several reasons, a state can reasonably require an association
to maintain liability insurance and impose liability on the association
to the extent of its insurance coverage. Mandatory insurance helps
plaintiffs, allowing them to sue only the association and providing an
accessible fund to pay the judgment. It will be easier for one insurance
carrier to defend than if dozens of unit owners and dozens of insurance
carriers are involved. Mandatory insurance also reduces the possible
risks and expenses to the judgment creditor of a scheme based solely
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on joint unit owner liability. Alternatively, a state could require the

unit owners to maintain individual liability insurance. But multiple
policies will likely cost more in the aggregate and compliance with the
requirement will be harder to police. Moreover, multiple policies again

mean multiple defendants, multiple insurance companies, and the confusion that inevitably accompanies them.
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE AGGREGATE MODEL ASCENDANT

Analyzed together, the foregoing conclusions and considerations

support a tort liability scheme for condominiums along the following
lines.
First, the unit owners association should be monetarily liable only
to the extent of its liability insurance.140 States should require associations to have liability insurance,14 and should be more assertive in
setting minimum dollar amount coverage. A five million dollar policy,

for example, will cover most claims. A state might also require an
association to set aside, in a separate escrow account, a sum equal to
the policy deductible amount. To the extent of this insurance, states

should restrict claimants to suing associations and should prohibit suits
against individual unit owners on any theory unless an owner actively
participated in the tort.
Second, unit owners at the time of the tort should be personally
liable for any portion of a judgment not covered by the association's
insurance.- Subsequent sales of units should be irrelevant, and later

takers of units should enjoy full immunity.

140. This liability limit would eliminate the temptation that unit owners might have to
dissolve their association and replace it with a new one when the association is hit with a large
judgment. Unit owners might allow a creditor to seize all of the assets of their association, but
halt creditor attempts to seize further assessments by forming a new association and diverting
assessment payments to the new association. See UNIF. CONDOMINIUMI ACT § 3-117 comment
2, 7 U.L.A. 531-32 (1980). A move of this type would raise difficult issues of successor liability.
Moreover, it may seem distinctly unfair to a creditor. But the uniform acts largely follow an
entity theory, and under that theory such a move seems proper.
141. As an option, states could allow unit owners to maintain their own individual policies.
See UNIF. CONDOMINIUm ACT § 3-113(c), 7 U.L.A.. 521 (1980). But see infra note 147.

142. Unit owners should be liable whether or not the unit owners associations incorporates.
Given the financial incompetence of associations, states should not respect them as jural entities
and allow them to shield the liability of the unit owners, even when they incorporate. As noted,
however, even if an association's corporate status is respected, a creditor can reach a unit
owner's assets indirectly by halting the association's activities until the unit owners fund the
judgment. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
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Third, the liability of unit owners should be joint only.'" If it

chooses, a state might set a cap on this liability, but should do so in
fixed dollar terms rather than a cap based on unit value.'"
Fourth, unit owners should have the same right to sue the association as do third parties.
Fifth, the association should have full power to defend the litigation
on behalf of all unit owners, 45 and plaintiffs should have no obligation
to name or serve unit owners individually except as constitutional due
process requires. If a judgment exceeds the association's insurance,
the unit owners should have no power to challenge the judgment, just
as general partners cannot challenge a judgment against the partnership. A unit owner, however, should have the right, at any time, to
settle the creditor's claims against him for his pro-rata share of any
excess liability.
Finally, the standard of care for management of the common areas
should be the standard applicable to private residence owners. 146 This
standard should apply to all plaintiffs, both unit owners and outsiders.
The association and unit owners should be liable for the negligence of
association employees and agents as described above. In addition, if
the unit owners have assigned some task to the association not required
by law, courts should impose liability as described above if the task
is performed negligently or not at all.
As may be clear, this proposed liability scheme follows the aggregate scheme quite closely. The association, it is true, is liable as a
distinct entity, but the liability is rather technical in nature. With
only slight change, the association's mandatory insurance policy could
name unit owners, rather than the association, as the insured parties.

143.

In this context, joint liability should mean that liability is allocated among unit owners

in the same manner that common expenses are allocated. In the case of a tort involving limited
common areas, liability should be apportioned in the same manner as expenses relating to the
areas.
144. In setting a cap, a state might reasonably choose to employ categories of caps that
depend in some way on the size of the complex and the value of the units.
145. This power should include the power to handle appeals and to settle.
146. When a condominium is composed of businesses or includes commercial business operations in the common areas, the standard of care in and around the business property should
be the standard expected of businesses.
In the case of a condominium unit that is leased, the tenant should receive the same level

of care as a unit owner. See Hemispheres Condominium Ass'n v. Corbin, 357 So. 2d 1074, 1076
(3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1978). A different result might be justified if
most units are rented and the association is, for that reason, the functional equivalent of a

landlord. A court might then require an association to fulfill the duties imposed on landlords.
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With this change, the association legitimately could escape all liability.147 Otherwise, the only deviations from the aggregate model lie in

the ban on several liability and in the association's power to control
the litigation. The latter limit is simply practical in nature. Since the
association is democratically run and has interests identical to those
of the unit owners collectively, it is a limit of modest cost to unit
owners and of great value to plaintiffs. The ban on several liability
differs from the usual aggregate scheme, but not in a disruptive way.
This proposed scheme avoids all of the principal problems discussed
above. '8 It respects the democratic judgment of the unit owners acting
collectively, and allows them to set their own safety standards subject
only to the minimums applicable to other residence owners. It recognizes the lack of realistic unit owner control by holding unit owners
only jointly liable for judgments, but does not carry the control issue
to the extreme by imposing liability only on a financially insubstantial
entity. It eliminates all alienability concerns as well as the possibility
of knotty misrepresentation claims based on seller nondisclosure. 14" By
attaching no importance to the amount of an owner's equity, the
scheme eliminates fairness complaints, among owners, and undercuts

147. Problems would arise if unit owners had different insurance carriers and different
coverages. Since insurance carriers generally demand the right to handle litigation, the smooth
handling of the tort action defense could easily break down amidst the conflicting desires of the
insurance companies.
148. One ground for criticism of this plan is that it creates different treatment for an
association's contract creditors and its tort claimants. Contract creditors could reach the association's assets while tort claimants could not. Given the thin line between contract and tort
claims, the distinction, arguably, is artificial.
Several answers can be given to this criticism. First, the tort-contract distinction commonly
serves as a critical determinant of liability. General partners, for example, are jointly liable for
contract debts but jointly and severally liable for tort claims. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT

§ 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1914). Second, contract claimants can seize an association's assets, but tort
claimants will have access to mandatory liability insurance and greater unit owner liability.
Thus, in most cases the tort claimant will have a better fund for recovery. Third, a contract
claim is less likely than a tort claim to bankrupt an association. The tort setting, therefore,
presents an increased need to limit association liability and shift liability to the unit owners.
Contract claims are more likely to involve small dollar amounts, and are therefore the cases in
which the creditor would be burdened unduly by having to seek to collect from the unit owners
personally. Tort claims, particularly those in excess of a liability insurance policy, are likely to
be large enough to justify considerable creditor collection efforts.
149. Associations would still be compelled to pay litigation costs, despite their lack of any
liability in excess of their insurance. If the applicable insurance policy does not cover these
costs, the association will face a burden, and purchasers perhaps should be told of this burden.
Except in very small complexes, however, the burden is unlikely to be considerable.
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owner attempts to protect themselves by encumbering their units.
Finally, the scheme gives unit owners an easy and effective way to
settle and thereby avoid future involvement.
From the public's perspective, this scheme is also attractive. The
public benefits, of course, from the free alienability of units. But the
public also benefits from the association's lack of liability in excess of
its insurance coverage. The scheme prevents a judgment creditor from
hindering an association and bringing its safety and maintenance activities to a halt. For tort claimants as well, the liability scheme is
beneficial, although less so than a scheme based on several liability.
The claimant need only sue and deal with the association. Mandatory
insurance will provide a substantial fund to cover judgments, and
liability policies of individual unit owners will supplement that fund.
A claimant will still need to track down unit owners if his judgment
exceeds the association's insurance coverage. But most unit owners
will probably remain residents of the complex, and those that have
disappeared will at least be reasonably identifiable by name, both
through recorded land titles and from discovery on the association.
In a situation that presents a real risk for a claimant, a court might
require the association to keep track of all unit owners. Finally, when
the claimant does find the unit owners, he need not relitigate his
claim. A court might facilitate his collection efforts by including in its
judgment a list of the unit owners and the amount of their individual
liabilities. 150
Obviously, this proposed liability scheme differs considerably from
those proposed in the Uniform Condominium Act and the Uniform
Common Interest Ownership Act. It also deviates from other typical
statutory schemes and from several of the appellate decisions now on
the books. But the general topic is one that has received relatively
little attention to date, and courts and legislatures may still make
substantial changes in directing trends. So long as associations lack
financial substance, the entity model creates unacceptable costs. With
slight modification, the aggregate model better fits the realities of the
condominium setting and better reconciles the interests of unit owners
and tort claimants.
150.

In some cases, to be sure, creditor collection efforts will prove difficult. The annoyance

for a creditor could be particularly great if his claim, once divided among the unit owners,
involves only a small dollar amount. Yet, if a claim is small per unit, the association might well

pay off on behalf of the unit owners, even if it need not do so. Moreover, since most of the
unit owners will still own property in the condominium complex, the creditor can readily obtain
judgment liens on their real property. A creditor disinclined to proceed with foreclosure of the

liens might sit back and wait, knowing that the unit owners at some point will likely pay the
judgment (with interest) to remove the title cloud caused by the liens.
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